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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1996, under Chapter 205 of the 1996 Acts and Resolves, the Massachusetts Legislature
authorized the McCormack Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Massachusetts
Boston to "review and explore possible cost savings within the Central Artery/Third Harbor
Tunnel project" and to report its findings to the House and Senate Committees on Ways and
Means and the Joint Committee on Transportation. For this study, the Institute assembled an
interdisciplinary team from within itsown ranks and outside, first, to examine the composition
and rationale for the project's estimated cost of$10.4+ billion and, second, to identify possible
cost savings within this budget. This report describes the findings, conclusions and
recommendations of this effort. Our major findings are summarized below:
1. The sizeable cost to design and build these seven miles of Interstate roadways in and
adjacent to Downtown Boston is attributable to three major factors;
• The extensive tunneling and complicated interchanges required to rebuild and extend
the express highway system through the center of an active and vibrant metropolitan
region. This has required the design and execution of 119 interlinked construction
contracts in eight different construction zones, each densely developed and heavily
used.
• The need for the design and construction to not only make long term improvements to
the urban and natural environment mandated by law but also to take measures to
insure the on-going operations of the city during the construction process. This is
reflected in 1500 separate mitigation agreements developed during the course ofproject
planning and design.
• The time - over two decades - needed to undertake engineering and design work,
mitigation agreements and construction and the impact of inflation.
While there is no precise way to allocate the costs to these three factors, we estimate that about
30% to 35% of the cost can be attributed to the required tunneling and interchange
construction alone, about 25% to 30% to the measures needed to mitigate the impacts of the
construction and meet required environmental standards, and up to 40% to account for
inflation and cost escalation resulting from a 25 year design and construction period.
2. Of the total budget, over two thirds has been either spent or committed. The engineering
design is virtually complete, and construction on all the major components is well underway.
Reductions in the scope of the project or major changes in mitigation agreements at this stage
would be difficult and would create many unacceptable consequences for the city and region.
3. To achieve budget reductions in the scale of2% to 4%, that is, $250 to $450 million, the
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project would have to rely principally on measures to avoid all delays and unanticipated
changes in planned scope for all remaining construction packages, plus good luck in
completing packages on the critical path on or ahead of schedule. Keeping all elements of the
project on schedule is critical to cost control and containment. So far, the project has been
remarkably free of contractor litigation which has been key to maintaining the schedule.
4. To date, the challenges of managing the complicated engineering design and difficult
construction process have been met by the CA/T project management team. However, there
are already upward cost pressures as the tunneling operations in downtown Boston move
ahead. The continued diligent application of the cost control and containment measures
already in place will be required to keep the budget within existing targets. There are a whole
battery of such measures which require extensive cooperation among all the "parties at
interest," not only the project management and the contractors, but the Legislature, other
state regulatory agencies, and local communities as well. These measures fall into two major
areas:
• In operating the construction program, now well underway.
• In downsizing and transferring functions from the management team of the Joint
Venture contractor, who has carried the burden of managing the design and
construction process to date, to the permanent agencies responsible for the ultimate
operation of the system — the Massachusetts Highway Department and the
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.
5. Most of the key measures involve the management of the contract bidding and
administration process within the domain of the project management. However, there are
some measures which require legislative action or interagency cooperation to avoid
unnecessary costs (See Table 1). These include:
• Changes in the laws governing the bidding process, particularly exemptions from filed
sub-bid requirements, and experimenting with A-B bidding procedures.
• Changes in other legislatively mandated requirements, (use of police details, for
example).
• Relief from redundant environmental review requirements and assistance of other
state and local agencies in dealing with soil and landfill issues.
6. The still unformulated changes in the program for federal government funding cfhighway
construction are not likely to provide the same high level of federal participation in the CA/T
program as in the past This means higher levels of state resources may be needed to complete
thejob. The passage ofthe transportation bond bill and the legislation creating the Metropolitan
Highway System were essential to keep the project on track. The current favorable environment
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for state borrowing and the use of Grant Anticipation Notes should ease the burden of this
increase on overall state finances . However, there is a need to address the policy issues involving
revenue generation — tolls, user fees, gas taxes, and others — as the CA/T system is put into
operation.
7. There are a substantial number ofbenefits and beneficiaries that will result from the CA/T
project. However, there are two categories of beneficiaries who will benefit more than the rest.
These are:
• The direct users of the system, particularly the downtown-bound and airport-bound
users of 1-90 and 1-93 links when completed.
• The owners of property, particularly in the downtown Boston and South Boston
waterfront industrial area, who will have access to their land extensively enhanced at the
expense of the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth must examine the ways through which these beneficiaries can contribute
their fair share to the on-going costs ofthe CA/T program, including the substantial debt service
the Commonwealth and its agencies will incur.
8. As the CA/T program continues in its major construction phase, there are two important
areas in which the Legislature can and should play a role:
• Monitoring the changes in the cost and budget allocations to anticipate problems which
may require legislative action in the future.
Addressing the issues of cost recovery, including user charges, returns on land value
enhancements, and others.
The following is a summary of the principal findings, conclusions and recommendations in the
six chapters which comprise the body of this report.
Chapter 1 — The history and evolution of CA/T costs
• The size of the budget is dictated by two interrelated factors: first, the decision to finish
the region's interstate highway system by rebuilding and extending it in the heart of the
regional center and, second, to undertake the construction with full weight given to the
needs and concerns of affected parties — the business and residential communities and
the natural environment.
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The increases over the initial estimates are due to scope changes essential to mitigate the
construction impacts, plus inflation and the escalation ofestimated cost over two decades.
• The controversies involving the most difficult program elements (Central Artery North
Area and the Fort Point Channel crossings) were costly in both money and time.
Chapter 2 -- The current budget
• The budget of $10.4+ billion estimated in the Finance Plan could, in fact, be closer to
$10.7 to $11.0 billion. The pressure on the budget is upward, in part as a result of
mitigation measures required to control noise and dust and to maintain traffic flow in
downtown Boston
.
• Over 25% of the budget has been allocated to engineering design and management and
most of it is already spent No major redesign is possible without severe difficulty.
• Most of the budget allocated for actual construction will be committed by the end of
1998. Actual construction is proceeding on all the key components of the program.
• Close to half of the construction budget is allocated to two critical areas — the northern
section of the Artery and the 1-93 /I-90 Interchange. Both are complicated because of
the difficult engineering and mitigation challenges involved.
• Mitigation measures - both permanent and temporary - are a major portion of the
budget and have been required to both obtain legal approvals and maintain public and
political support for the program.
• At this stage of advancement, changes in project scope in order to reduce budgeted costs
are not possible without severe damage or delay to the program and its outcome. Many
would have the effect of dumping more traffic onto local streets in the areas through
which the project is being built
Chapter 3 - Cost containment/reduction in the construction process
• At this stage, interactions between projectmanagement and the construction contractors
provide the major arena for cost savings. Keeping the construction program on schedule
is the key.
• The range of potential savings is narrow. The program needs strong management and
good luck to keep within a 2% to 4% reduction range.
• There are measures identified by both contractors and management which can help to
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contain and reduce costs. These are primarily in the area of contract administration —
bid policy, partnering policy, change order policy, the Value Engineering Change
Proposals (VECP) program, and others.
There are also some legislative actions and interagency cooperative agreements which
can help - filed sub-bid relief, new bidding methods, environmental assistance, etc.
• Appropriate legislative committees need to maintain vigilance over the program.
Chapter 4 — Cost containment/reduction in project management
• The costs to design and manage the project have been great — a function of the time and
engineering detail required to satisfy all the difficult program requirements.
•
•
As the construction process moves ahead, ways should be found to relieve the costs of
project management by reducing the staffnow on the payroll of the Joint Venture.
There are two possible methods for achieving this: first, by switching some functions to
thepermanent agencies (Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and MassachusettsHighway
Department) as they become geared up to manage the metropolitan highway system; and
second, by reducing overlapping functions in the project management team.
Chapter 5 -- Financing CA/T
• Changes in the federal funding formula for highway support and its uncertain future
may put pressure on the Commonwealth to come up with more financial support for the
CA/T project than was anticipated at the outset.
The state transportation bond and Metropolitan Highway System legislation both
provide needed resources essential to completing the CA/T program. The current low
interest fiscal environment should help lessen the unfavorable impact ofsuch large state
borrowing on the overall budget of the Commonwealth.
The advent of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) as the key operator of the
completed CA/T system offers opportunities for sound policies and programs to generate
user revenues. These will be needed to help repay the debt
The use ofGrant Anticipations Notes (GANS) will help to bridge the period ofcash flow
or obligations deficit between 1998 and 2001.
The new bond legislation permits project construction to move quickly and locks current
low interest rates into construction borrowing.
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Chapter 6 — Benefits and beneficiaries
• When completed, the project will produce many benefits for the region including
improved traffic flow in the regional center, new environmental amenities, and new
opportunities for economic development.
• However, some will receive benefits greater than most Two categories stand out: first,
the highway travelers heading to and through downtown Boston and Logan Airport;
second, the owners and users of property in downtown Boston and the industrial areas
of South Boston.
• The issues of future public policy arising from the CA/T project should focus on how and
in what form these beneficiaries should help pay their fair share of the costs of the
program. There is time to work out the issues involved, which should be placed high on
the regional agenda.
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Table 1. -SUMMARY OF CA/T COST CONTAINMENT/REDUCTION MEASURES
INVOLVING CA/T
MANAGEMENT
POLICIES
REQUIRING
LEGISLATIVE
SUPPORT
REQUIRING
INTERAGENCY
COOPERATION
IN THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS
Contract bidding
procedure
Expanding the
contractor bidding
pool
Bid acceptance policy
A-B bidding procedure
Filed sub-bid exemption
Contract administration
Environmental regulatory
assistance
Partnering policy
Change order policy
VECP policy
A "deductible" for
change orders
Additional landfill sites
Relief from unneeded
reviews
Revised soil quality
definitions
Other Measures
IN PROJECT
MANAGEMENT
Wrap-around
insurance program
Requirements for police
details
Approving vertical
construction plans and
specs
Duplication of functions
Community relations
activities
Non-essential functions
Transfer of
permanent functions
now carried out by
Joint Venture to
MHD and MTA
Rationalization of CA/T
related fiscal affairs,
interagency coordination
and community relations
within EOTC agencies.
Note: Bold denotes measures of potential major impact on future costs and/or requiring priority attention and
monitoring.
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AN EXPLORATION OF POTENTIAL COST SAVINGS FOR THE CENTRAL
ARTERY/TUNNEL PROJECT
INTRODUCTION
The John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Massachusetts Boston is an
institution whose primary mission is public service. Through public policy research, educational
programs, policy practice and the dissemination ofknowledge, the Institute seeks to have a constructive
impact on policy formulation, problem solving and public discourse concerning urgent civic challenges
facing state and local government in the New England region.
In 1996, under Chapter 205 of the 1996 Acts and Resolves, the Massachusetts legislature authorized
the Institute to undertake a study *to review and explore possible cost savings within the Central
Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel project" and report its findings to the House and Senate Committees
on Ways and Means and the Joint Committee on Transportation.
In devising the scope of study, our focus has been on analyzing costs of the project through the prism
of good public policy — that is, to identify the interests of the Commonwealth, as the ultimate owner of
the project, in its size and scope, current status, and expected outcomes. Our team consisted of
experienced public policy analysts recruited from within the ranks ofthe Institute and outside. It included
experts on engineering and construction industry practices in the Commonwealth, but with no past or
current involvement in the CA/T program.
With this focus and objective, we did not play the role of a financial auditor or an evaluator of the
engineering designs. We did not play the role ofan in-depth evaluator ofmanagement practices as would
an outside management expert. Nor did we attempt to duplicate the legally mandated reviews of the
numerous federal and state agencies with continuing responsibly for project oversight. Our role, then,
has been that of a neutral broker.
The starting point for this review was the cost estimates contained in the Massachusetts Highway
Department Finance Plan for the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, dated September 30, 1996, which
estimated the overall cost of the project at $10.4+ billion when completed. $4.9 billion has been
spent as of June 30, 1996.
Already Spent to 6/30/96 Needed to Complete
Construction $2.4 billion (49%) Construction $4.8 billion (87%)
Management $1.3 billion (27%) Management $0,505 billion (9%)
Engineering Design $0.8 billion (16%) Engineering Design $0,179 billion (3%)
Right of Way $0.4 billion (8%) Right of Way $ 0.45 billion (1%)
Totals $4.9 billion (100%) Totals $5.5 billion (100%)
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Our first major task was to determine the basis for these project costs by reviewing the elements that
make up this sum. These elements include the complicated construction required for the extensive
tunneling and intersection design, the long term and short term mitigation measures needed, the
relocation of utilities, the scheduling of the various program elements, the management costs associated
with an extensive and lengthy design and construction process, and the benefits associated with each.
Our next task was to examine the question of whether any costs could be reduced or eliminated and
what the impacts of such actions would be. For this analysis, we reviewed four principal areas in which
there is significant budget allocated for project completion or important implications for how the project
can be completed. The four areas are:
• Proposals for potential scope reductions ( as identified in the Finance Plan)
• The construction process, to identify possible cost saving and containment measures
• Possible savings in program management costs
• The funding status of the project
To undertake these reviews, the study team examined the extensive documentation generated in the
course of the program by project management, oversight agencies, the press, and others. This
documentation included the monthly management reports prepared by project management to track
progress on all phases of the program. We also attended a number of legislative hearings, meetings,
seminars, and conferences where issues related to the project have been discussed and debated. In
addition, we interviewed scores of people who have played an important role in formulating or carrying
out the project, including both those supportive and those critical. Among those interviewed were the
project management staff, former officials of state transportation agencies, Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), Government Accounting Office (GAO), Massachusetts Highway Department
(MHD), the Massachusetts Department of Finance and Administration, the Inspector General's staff
and other agency staff; engineers, construction contractors and other consultants associated with the
project, representatives of community and environmental groups, and others. To respect the
confidentiality and candor ofthese contacts, we have made no attempt to attribute specific remarks and
attitudes to any of those interviewed. We have listened carefully to a variety of views and opinions, but
this report reflects exclusively the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the study team.
The following report summarizes the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this review. The
results are contained in six chapters and an appendix containing cost information on the project:
Chapter 1 - The history and evolution of CA/T costs
Chapter 2 - The current budget
Chapter 3 — Cost containment/reduction in the construction process
Chapter 4 — Cost containment/reduction in project management
Chapter 5 - Financing
Chapter 6 — The benefits and beneficiaries
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CHAPTER 1 - THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF CA/T COSTS
To understand the basis for the costs of the Central Artery/Tunnel project, one must first understand
three important aspects of the undertaking: the physical and environmental setting of the project, the
decision-making process that led to its parameters, and the expected product and results of the
investment.
The physical and environmental setting
The project involves the building of two major express highway links in the center of the Boston
metropolitan region, first an extension of the Massachusetts Turnpike (Interstate Route 90) across
Boston Harbor to Logan International Airport and, second, the rebuilding in an underground tunnel
system of the existing elevated Central Artery (Interstate Route 93) which runs north and south through
Downtown Boston. To a large extent, these two highway links augment a system of hub and spoke
expressways conceived after World Warn and designed to provide major highway capacity in the center
of the region and relieve the older urban arteries that became overburdened with the growth ofpost-war
traffic.
The urban environment in which this construction is taking place, however, is one of the most difficult
for any highway system built in the nation. Downtown Boston is a densely packed business,
governmental, financial, cultural and tourism center. As the locus for over 300,000 jobs, it is the largest
economic center in New England. This historic center is surrounded by water - Boston Harbor and the
numerous rivers feeding into it. Across the Harbor on an isolated peninsula is the New England region's
major airport, which has emerged as one of the important pieces of infrastructure supporting the great
high tech, financial, health and educational enterprises that characterize the region's modern economy.
Both the land and water environments in and around the regional center are sensitive, and major
investments have been and are being made to preserve both. The neighborhoods surrounding downtown
Boston are active places providing the sites for many of the nation's most important educational and
cultural institutions, along with highly prized housing resources for a diverse urban population. This is
in contrast to many American cities where the abandonment of neighborhoods adjacent to central
business districts made it relatively easy to build express highways around the downtown perimeter.
Boston's physical and environmental structure has forced the planning for transportation improvements
in the region into a uniquely limited framework.
In the period after World War n, the region's planning authorities developed a long range plan for
highways which called for eight radial expressways to center on downtown Boston, along with three
circumferential expressways — an outer belt (now route 495), a middle belt (now route 128 -1-95) and
an inner belt to be built through the densely packed communities close to downtown. 1 In the late 1950s
1
This plan was first proposed in 1948 and adopted by the State Department of Public Works (now MHD)
and reaffirmed in subsequent plans. Some but not all of these roads were to be part of the Federal Interstate
Highway system, first proposed in 1944, but lacked funding until the passage of the Interstate Highway and
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and 1960s when the federal government's Interstate Highway program held out the promise for major
help to states and metropolitan regions in funding their plans for new highway infrastructure, the Boston
region's response was to start to build its planned circumferential and radial expressways (regional map,
Figure 1). The initial projects included upgrading Route 128 and building a new outer circumferential
(Route 1-495) to provide for traffic movement around the region and construction of some of the eight
radial expressways to center on downtown Boston. In the 1950's and 1960's three of these radial
expressways were built, along with the Central Artery: the Southeast Expressway (Route 3 south) , the
Mass. Turnpike (1-90) first to Route 128 in the 1950's then its extension from 128 to downtown in the
1960's , and 1-93 North, along with the rebuilding of Route 2 from Route 128 to Alewife. One of the
radials, Route 3 north, was built only to Route 128, with its extension to downtown Boston dropped
as a result of mounting pressure from the affected communities. The amount of housing and parkland
takings and community disruption required to complete the radials from Route 128 towards downtown
were causing substantial protests from the impacted communities. In addition, the plan to build a third
tunnel across Boston Harbor from downtown to Logan Airport was also running into opposition from
affected neighborhood groups in East Boston.
By 1970, plans were still underway to complete the system, the new Southwest Expressway (I-95S) was
to be built adjacent to the major railroad connecting Boston to the south and plans were in the works
for a new Northeast Expressway (I-95N) generally paralleling Route 1 North, along with the extension
of the Route 2 expressway, which had been built from Route 128 to Alewife. All these radials would
be connected near the center of the region by the Inner Belt Expressway (1-695), traversing the old
established community of Somerville, bisecting the City of Cambridge, crossing the Charles River in the
vicinity of Boston University and the Back Bay hospital complexes and the northern sections of
Roxbury, and connecting to the Southeast Expressway near the South End. As plans for these major
additions came closer to implementation, the affected communities began to object more strongly and
question the value of the whole expressway scheme.
The decision making process
In the early 1970's, in response to mounting community pressure, a moratorium on new express highway
construction inside Route 128 was declared by then-Governor Sargent. The landmark Boston
Transportation Planning Review was initiated to review all the plans and examine the options for each
of the radial highway corridors, including improved public transportation. By the end of this review, the
decision was made by the Sargent administration not to complete the original plan for the three
additional interstate standard expressways to be interconnected by the inner belt highway. This set in
motion a whole new strategy for improving the regional transportation system. First, it was decided to
put the immediate priority for regional transportation improvements on rebuilding and expanding the
existing rapid transit system in the corridors previously considered for the expressways, including
extensions to the system to intersect the highway network at strategic points (Alewife and Braintree).
It was further decided to revive and improve the region's substandard commuter rail services, which had
deteriorated extensively under private ownership. This program of transit improvements was the focus
Defense Act of 1956 which created the Highway Trust Fund to be financed through federal gas taxes.
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for construction activities through the remainder of the decade. To build these transit improvements,
federal funds available for Interstate highway construction were "traded in" as provided under revised
provisions of federal law. 2
Second, to meet the state's opportunity and obligation to complete the planned federal Interstate
highway system in the region, it was decided to interconnect Interstate 95 through the region by routing
it on the existing Route 128 around Boston and adjacent communities to the West, instead of building
Interstate 95 on new expressways in the Southwest corridor and in the Route 1 -North Shore corridor
as a radial connection. This left two major highway system improvements within route 128 on the
regional agenda; the first was a third harbor tunnel to the Airport and the second was the rebuilding of
the elevated portions of the Central Artery below grade, to complete the 1-93 radial system by
connecting its northern section with the Southeast Expressway through downtown. Since the inner belt
had been eliminated, the Artery corridor was the only route available to handle the growing
volumes of traffic moving through the center of the region. The elevated structure was becoming
obsolete and was an eyesore. Rebuilding it underground would not require the kind of land
taking that the inner belt would have involved.
For the rest of the decade of the 1970's, transit improvements were the prime focus for investments in
the region's transportation infrastructure. Various succeeding administrations favored either the Artery
or the Third Harbor Tunnel project as the next highway priority. 3 These two concepts for highway
improvements remained on the table, but there was no consensus on whether to proceed. Finally, in
1983, during the second Dukakis administration, it was decided to combine the two projects into a single
program. This would involve depressing and widening the Central Artery, building the new
tunnel to Logan Airport in a new alignment completely on airport property on the eastern end,
and connecting the two through the South Boston waterfront on a new seaport access road. The
plan would provide much needed improvement for traffic headed to the airport from the West and the
north shore but with much less disruption to the East Boston neighborhood than the earlier scheme. It
would further provide badly needed highway capacity to move traffic to and through downtown.
The improvements were eligible for funding under the federal interstate construction program, which
would cover 90% of eligible project costs. The tunnel and access road were the logical extension of
Interstate 90 from the end of the Massachusetts Turnpike at the intersection of the Southeast
expressway to the airport and north. The Central Artery reconstruction would link the two sections of
Interstate 93.
4
2
Massachusetts policy makers were a major part of the coalition lobbying Congress for these revisions in the use of Interstate Highway funds.
3
For a complete discussion of the history and controversies involved in the creation of the Central Artery/Tunnel project, see MEGA-
PROJECT - A Political History of Boston's Multi billion Dollar Artery/Tunnel Project, by David Luberoff and Alan Altshuler -- April, 1996
published by the Alfred Taubman Center for State and Local Government - John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
4
There were extensive controversies between the State and Federal administrations about the merits of the new scheme and its
eligibility for federal funding under the Interstate program. While the 1-90 extension to the airport was considered justified, the more expensive I-
93 Central Artery depression was considered by some to be more of an urban beautification than a highway project. The state officials agreed to a
compromise under which most, but not all, of the artery costs would be covered by the Interstate program. This policy was adopted in the 1987
surface transportation act which became the basis for project funding. (See Luberoff and Altshuler - Chapter III)
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The decision to depress and widen the Artery and to extend the Turnpike across the Fort Point Channel
to connect to the new tunnel required extensive tunneling in difficult, fully developed urban terrain.
The tunneling, moreover, could not disrupt the businesses and residential neighborhoods ofdowntown
Boston during what would be a long and difficult construction process. Achieving these goals would
require delicate and sensitive construction methods which would be costly.
With the federal funding in place, the state turned to the detailed planning needed to secure the
environmental and other permits required by both state and federal law. During this process, community
and environmental interests had to be satisfied, not only that the project would not harm interests but
also that it would advance them. The downtown business community had to be assured that the city
could continue to function during construction and that the project would be a positive contribution to
both traffic flow and urban amenities when completed. Throughout this process, state officials studied
dozens of solutions to pressing problems. By 1991, when the Weld administration took office, the
process for receiving formal approvals from both the Federal Highway Administration and state
environmental regulators was well advanced.
Through this decision making process, the fundamental commitments to build and fund the project were
agreed to by Massachusetts policy makers over the last three decades, and endorsed by subsequent
administrations, legislatures, and the federal government.
The expected results
As a result of this series of decisions made over an extended period and participated in by state, city and
federal government officials with the participation of the local business, environmental and residential
communities, the Central Artery/Tunnel project came to resemble not just the traditional urban
highway construction project but something much more. Through the use of the highway
construction process, major improvements would be made to the whole urban environment of
the region's center. The Central Artery, one of the nation's most congested highways carrying over
190,000 vehicles a day on a structure designed for 90,000, would be rebuilt and depressed. When
expanded and put underground the rebuilt highway would not only improve traffic access to and through
downtown Boston but would open up the surface to extensive environmental improvements, particularly
in the historic North End neighborhood and in adjacent valuable waterfront locations. Connecting the
Mass Turnpike directly to Logan Airport would not only greatly improve the transport access to this
key regional facility but also provide access to a large area of under- developed urban land sandwiched
between downtown and the airport along the South Boston waterfront. These enhancements would help
additional development and improvement of both of these areas.
When one examines the scope and nature of this scheme, one finds that it goes far beyond the
characteristics of conventional urban highway construction. It appears to have more in common with
major urban surgery -- the equivalent of an arterial bypass operation applied to a functioning urban
patient, requiring the skill and sensitivity akin to that of a highly competent medical team, in addition to
highly creative highway design, engineering, and construction. This surgerywould be performed in front
of a very large audience of oversight agencies, government officials and agency heads, anxious
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(in millions)
Estimate Exclusions Changes Inflation Projected Cost
2,564.0 - - - 2,564.0
3,185.0
4,436.0
46.0 565.0 3,175.0
799.0 462.0 4,446.0
5,193.0 299.0 458.0 5,193.0
6,443.0 609.0 641.0 6,443.0
7,740.0 869.0 428.0 7,740.0
7,740.0 998.0 259.0
2,881.0
1387.0
3,941.0
10,384.0
community groups, the press and the general public. This has provided the basis for the costs of the
entire program, currently estimated to be $10.4+ billion, to complete the surgery successfully.
The evolution of project costs
While the detailed planning, environmental reviews and negotiations with interest groups in the period
from 1985 to 1993 were necessary to move the project through the rigorous permitting process while
maintaining political and community support, they also drove up the total costs.
Table 1.1 - History of Project Cost Estimates
Year
1985
1987
1989
1991
1992
1993
1995
Total
1996 10,400.0 10,400.0
Before the detailed planning and engineering began on the project in 1985, the early studies estimated
the cost to be $ 2,564 billion. This was the figure used by Massachusetts officials responsible for
developing the project to obtain the required backing of the federal government, which was expected
to fund most of the costs through the Interstate Highway Program. The figure was based on estimated
1982 construction prices and did not include the cost of inflation. Once the project had received the
approval to move ahead and the environmental and design studies begun, its scope began to take its full
shape, with the active participation of the variety ofcommunity and environmental interest groups with
important stakes in the outcome. In this phase, a variety of critical issues emerged involving not only the
design of the highway segments and their method ofconstruction but also the impact ofthe construction
on the affected communities and on the overall environment.
In this period, there were also fundamental issues raised about the cost of the project and its impact on
the allocation of transportation funding resources, including public transit improvements and highway
projects in other areas of the Commonwealth. These issues, ranging from the very detailed to those
involving fundamental development policy, had to be worked out in order for the project to move ahead.
By 1988, when the preliminary detailed engineering design was begun, a number of serious issues
involving not only the design, engineering, and construction, but also the allocation of transportation
resources were still on the agenda of the policy makers with unresolved controversies still in the wind.
By 1992, after the engineering design was well underway and the construction process had begun, the
cost was estimated at $7.74 billion. In 1996, after most of the final engineering designs had been
completed, along with about one quarter of the construction (principally the Ted Williams Tunnel) , the
total cost was estimated at $10.4 billion, with $4.9 billion having been spent and $5.5 billion needed to
complete the program by 2005.
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There are four main reasons for this escalation in estimated cost over this almost 15-year period
ofdesign, engineering and conflict resolution. The first is the expansion ofbasic scope over time;
second, the extension of the schedule of completion; third, the changes needed to resolve
fundamental conflicts in the design and to meet required transportation and environmental
standards and agreed upon mitigation measures; and fourth, the effects of inflation. This cost
evolution is described in Table 1-1.
The increases in the scope of the project beyond the initial plan included:
Between 1985 and 1989:
• construction of the haul road through South Boston.
• extension of the southerly portion of the project from the South Bay to the Mass. Avenue
interchange.
• addition of high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes to the 1-90 segments of the project.
• addition of a new intersection connecting the airport interchange to Route 1A in East Boston.
Between 1989 and 1991:
• reconstruction of the northbound tunnel under Dewey Square.
• addition of tunnel covers over 1-90 in South Boston.
• adoption of "scheme Z" for the Charles River crossing and the addition of the tunnel connectors to
the project under City Square in Charlestown.
Between 1991 and 1992:
• addition of a number of public transit improvements and utility relocation projects to the Central
Artery and South Bay interchange areas.
• redesign of the Tunnel under the Fort Point Channel
• taking of additional land required as a result of court judgments.
• redesign of the Charles River crossing plans, scrapping "scheme Z".
These scope additions and changes were the result of extensive bargaining and negotiation between the
project designers and the affected "parties at interest," including community, business and environmental
groups, the Federal Highway Administration, and a variety of state agencies, with sometimes very
difficult issues to resolve. 5
It should be pointed out that probably the most serious problems affecting both the engineering design
and the overall project schedule and related costs were the disputes over the best plan for the Charles
River crossing and the best system to cross under the Fort Point Channel, two of the more complicated
design and construction elements in the entire scheme. Resolution of these major issues delayed the
completion of final designs and slowed the potential to meet the original project construction schedule,
See Luberoff and Alishuler, op.at.
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increasing the time and the cost of both the design and project management budgets. In 1991, before
these issues were resolved, the estimated time to complete the entire project was 1998. By 1993, when
the Issues were settled enough to let final design and construction proceed, the estimated time for final
completion of all construction slipped to 2004. 6
It should also be pointed out that the "funding environment" under which the planning, design, and
engineering of this complicated project was being conducted anticipated that the financial resources of
the Interstate Construction Program could be used in most aspects of the project. Thus the emphasis
was put on insuring that the program could pass environmental muster and that there was no
basis for the environmental critics to challenge the program in the courts. Cost containment was
not the focus of attention during this period.
However, with the passage ofIntermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 199 1 , which
provided increased funding for states to complete their interstate highway projects to reflect the effects
of inflation, there was an important change in federal policy. The commitment to pay the
"costs-to-complete" of unfinished Interstate project was ended. The last official estimates of costs were
used to determine the total amount ofInterstate Construction Fund financing that eligible projects would
receive. Any costs over and above these last official estimates would be funded on a different basis than
had been used in the past (The implications of this change on the CA/T project are discussed in Chapter
5).
As a result of the extension of the project scope, a number of other related construction elements were
added to the CA/T project . These were projects being constructed by other transportation agencies,
including MBTA and Massport, within the boundaries of the CA/T project and being managed as part
of the CA/T construction program. These "third party" costs are included in the overall budget of
$10.4+ billion, categorized as "support" or "exclusions" from federally funded elements in budget
descriptions.
Finally, in hindsight, it is possible to see what the impact of the inflationary pressures of more than a
decade of design and construction of the Central Artery/Tunnel project has been on the cost of all he
project elements. The provision for inflation for the period from 1985 to 2004 is estimated to account
for close to $4.0 billion of the increase over the 1985 estimates. This is the equivalent of about 40%
of the estimated cost of the entire program.
At the present time, the project is essentially fully designed and engineered, with the exception of
planning the use of land area reclaimed in downtown Boston after the current Central Artery viaduct
is dismantled and the tunneling system is completed. Construction is approaching 30% completion and,
by the end of 1997, virtually all the major construction contracts will have been let. With the design and
engineering controversies resolved for the most part, the project should be able to move ahead on
schedule, barring any major occurrence oflitigation or other unforeseen circumstance producing delay.
These completion dates were included in the Project Master Schedules Number 3 of 2/91 and Number 5 of 2/93 respectively.
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Table 1.2- SUMMARY OF CA/T COST HISTORY
DATE/CATEGORY
1983-85 -ORIGINAL ESTIMATE
Preliminary engineering —the basis for
Federal approvals
BASIC SCOPE ADDITIONS
FOR TRAFFIC FLOW
IMPROVEMENT
COST
$ 2.564 B.
COMMENT
This was the first estimate of total cost
for the core components of the Artery
and Tunnel based on early conceptual
designs and engineering
CHARLES RIVER Crossings redesigned to handle traffic
CROSSING - $ 508 M. so as to alleviate community concerns
and improve riverfront conditions
FHWA et. al. proposed to bring
HOV T ANFS
- $ 262 M. project up to modem highway
standards
Rebuilding of SE expressway viaduct
1-93 South extension-'-$ 130 M. to Mass. Ave.
Revised plan
Rte. 1A interchange -($18.0 M)
SPECIFIC COMMUNITY AND S. Bos. Tunnel Covers-- -$ 176 M.
ENVIRONMENT
IMPROVEMENTS S. Bos. ROW additions- $ 173 M.
S. Bos. By-pass Road— $ 23 M.
OTHER PREPARATION AND Hazardous waste disposal program
ENVBRONMENTAL MITIGATION $ 141 M.
Utility relocation $ 85 M.
NON- CONSTRUCTION B/PB Contract add on --$ 263 M.
OVERHEAD
Insurance $ 237 M.
Other $642M.
1993 REVISED ESTIMATE SCOPE CHANGES— $2,622 B.
+ 1985 ESTIMATE $2,564 B.
+ INFLATION $2,554 B.
=TOTAL $ 7.740 B.
1993- 1995 CHANGES SUPPORT COSTS $ 998 M.
DESIGN CHANGES—$ 259 M.
INFLATION $1,387 B.
1996 REVISED ESTIMATE 93-96 CHANGES -—$2,644 B.
+1993 ESTIMATE $7,740 B.
= TOTAL $10,384 B.
To protect community from traffic
noise
To provide better traffic flow and
property access
Haul road for trucks to mitigate
effects of construction activity
Required by State and Federal law
Required to tunnel under built up
sections of the city
Adjusted for additional scope
To save cost in construction bids
Detailed mitigation measures resulting
from final design solutions
Other project costs not using Federal
highway funds
Inflation to end of project -2004
These costs are the basis for the 1996
Financial plan
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CHAPTER 2 -- THE CURRENT BUDGET
Understanding the current budget ofthe Central Artery/Tunnel Project is preliminary to an examination
of the potential for cost reduction. In this chapter, therefore, we review first the structure and status
of the budget. Second, we analyze the budget allocation by program area for mitigation, and, finally
we review the scope changes and their implications.
Part 1. STRUCTURE AND STATUS
To determine what is included in the budget and its status, we have examined the management reports
which the CA/T project staff produces every month to track all aspects of project costs, including
changes in allocations to various categories due to shifts and changes in construction bids, change
orders and reallocations of budget items. Table 2. 1 shows the way the overall budget is reported and
summarized. The first column is the current budget with costs of all project components "unescaiated"
— that is, not reflecting the effects of inflation during the period from now to the year 2004. The second
column shows the current budget with costs "escalated" by about 9% to reflect the anticipated inflation,
and the third column provides a forecast of potential costs for all components based on current trends
in project expenditures.
The budget includes a "credit" for the recovery of air rights sales from the land made available as a
result of the depression of the Artery. These are estimates of what the MTA as project "owner" might
be able to recover from the sale of these parcels at some future date, a situation that will depend on the
status of the real estate market in downtown Boston at the time of potential sale. Since this is likely
to be a decade in the future, this figure can be considered as a speculative guess at this time. Without
this credit, the current total budget (escalated) would be $10,991 billion rather than the $10,736 billion
as shown below.
Table 2.1 - CA/T OVERALL COST
(as of 1/31/97 - per CA/T management report)
CURRENT BUDGET CURRENT BUDGET POTENTIAL
(UNESCALATED) (ESCALATED) (FORECAST)
$ 9.7S8 B. $ 10.736 B. $ 10.711 B.
(91%) (100%)
(excludes air rights credit) (includes air rights credit) (includes air rights credit)
Note also that the current budget as of January 1997 is higher than the $10.4+ billion figure in
the Finance Plan, reflecting seven months ofchanges in construction estimates, bid experience,
and increases in other costs. As the project moves ahead into the period of maximum
construction, the monthly movement of the budget bears careful monitoring, particularly to
determine the causes of any upward or downward trend both in the overall budget and specific
components. While the federal and state oversight agencies watch these numbers carefully, we
recommend that the legislature also keep watch. This will be essential not only for tracking
CA/T progress but also for anticipating legislative action on funding and other measures.
Table 2.2 shows the breakdown of the overall budget by funding category -- the direct costs (close to
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85% of the total) are those which are eligible for and supported by federal highway funds, while the
remaining 1 59c are categorized as "support costs". These include the budget for those elements funded
primarily by state and local transportation agencies (third parties) but within the scope of the CA/T
project. These agencies include the three transportation authorities - the Massachusetts Port Authority
(MPA), the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), and the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority (MTA).
Table 2.2 --CA/T OVERALL COSTS BY FUNDING CATEGORY
(Current Budget Escalated)
Supported by Federal highway DIRECT $ 9.046 B.
funds COSTS
Primarily State and local agency SUPPORT $ 1.690 B.
funding COSTS
TOTAL
COSTS
$10,736 B.
(Includes credit of $255 m. for
sales of air rights)
(Includes third party costs of
$ 270 m.)
Table 2.3 shows the overall budget broken down by function: 1) those associated with the design,
engineering and management of the project including insurance; and 2) those associated with actual
construction, including the more than 1 19 separate construction packages plus the costs of acquiring
rights of way, the relocation of utilities (force accounts), and geotechnical services required to prepare
the project area for the construction of the roadways and intersections. Note that over one quarter of
the budget has been allocated to design/engineering/management related costs — a reflection, we
believe, of the complicated and time-consuming nature of the engineering required, including the
construction related and long term mitigation solutions which building in this dense urban environment
demanded. The preliminary design work was undertaken by the Bechtel/Parsons Brinkerhoff Joint
Venture and is included in their budget. Final designs undertaken by other engineering firms are
included in the section design budget. The insurance budget includes the cost of insuring the
construction work against accidents — a service which is being purchased centrally by the CA/T project
rather than by individual construction contractors as a cost saving measure.
Table 2.3 -CA/T OVERALL COSTS BY FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY
(Current Budget Escalated ~ Direct and Support Costs Combined)
CONSTRUCTION RELATED COSTSDESIGN/ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT
COSTS
$ 2.933 B.
(27%)
$7,803 B.
(73%)
$ 7.257 B.— CONSTRUCTION
PACKAGES
$ . 801 B.— RIGHT OF WAY
UTILITY RELOCATION
(Force accounts)
GEOTECH
( $. 255 B )— Air rights credit
Table 2.4 shows the amount of the overall budget committed as of the end of January, 1997. Close
B/PB JOINT VENTURE - $ 1.632 B.
SECTION DESIGNS $ 1.028 B.
(includes force account designs)
INSURANCE (MGT. RES.) -$ 0.273 B.
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to $7.0 billion, over 65% of the entire cost of the project, has already been allocated to various
project activities, including both design and management functions and construction contracts.
Over 60% of the direct construction budget and over three-fourths of other project costs have been
committed, reflecting the status of a project virtually all engineered and well underway in the
construction program. (Note that according to the February, 1997 Management Report, the
committed amount had reached $ 7.294 billion, and in the March Report, $ 7.697 billion).
Table 2.4 CA/T OVERALL COSTS COMMITTED
(as of 1/31/97)
Total = $ 6.936 B. (65%)
OTHER PROJECT COSTS DIRECT CONSTRUCTION
$ 2.219 B. (76%) $ 4.717 B. (60%)
Table 2.5 shows the amount of uncommitted current (escalated) budget along with the potential
forecast as of the end of January, 1997. The expected "to go" costs represent just over one third of
the overall budget.
Table 2.5 -CA/T UNCOMMITTED BUDGET
(TO GO COSTS - as of 1/31/97)
DIRECT AND SUPPORT COSTS COMBINED
CURRENT BUDGET POTENTIAL FOR]
(ESCALATED)1
TOTAL $ 10.736 B. $ 10.711 B.
COMMITTED (1/31/97) $ 6.936 B. $ 6.936 B.
UNCOMMITTED $ 3.800 B. $ 3.775 B.
1
. Includes credit for sales of air rights.
Table 2.6 shows the allocation of uncommitted costs by function: 1) for construction which
accounts for over 87% of the remaining budget to be committed; and 2) other project costs, of
which the cost of the Joint Venture is the major item. It is expected that much more of the
remaining uncommitted portions of the construction budget will be allocated to construction
contractors by the end of 1997.
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Table 2.6 -CA/T UNCOMMITTED BUDGET ("TO GO" COSTS) - BY CATEGORY
(as of 1/31/97)
DIRECT AND SUPPORT COSTS COMBINED
BUDGET (ESCALATED) FORECAST
CONSTRUCTION
CONSTRUCTION $ 3.184 B. $ 3.384 B.
PACKAGES
FORCE ACCOUNTS $ 113 M. $124M.
RIGHT OF WAY $ 44 M. $ 102 M.
Air rights sales ($255 M.) ($ 255 M.)
Geotech
CONSTRUCTION $ 3.086 B. $ 3.355 B.
TOTAL
OTHER COSTS
B/PB MANAGEMENT $ 638 M. $ 638 M.
DESIGN CONTRACTS $192 M. $ 172 M.
(Includes section and
force accounts 3rd party)
INSURANCE ($ 241 M.) ($390 M.)
MANAGEMENT $125M.
RESERVE
OTHER TOTAL $ 714 M. $ 420 M.
This picture of the budget and its allocation reflects a project which is substantially into the
construction phase, providing little, if any, opportunity to undertake changes in the scope,
planning, design, engineering, or other aspects of the project, including changes in the agreed
upon mitigation measures which have been built into various construction contracts. To a great
extent, the future of the project lies in the hands of the construction contractors who have been
given a go-ahead to build the various project elements as designed. Their ability to perform
within their contracted budgets and meet all the commitments agreed to will be the key to
completing the project within this budget.
Part 2. BUDGET ALLOCATION BY PROGRAM AREA
The $10.4+ billion is allocated to 119 contracts covering engineering, design and construction
management spread out over some 7.5 linear miles of area in downtown Boston and adjacent
communities. In the Management Reports, the budget is allocated to three major segments: the 1-90
packages ( the segments connecting Mass Pike to the Airport through East Boston and the Ted Williams
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Tunnel), the 1-93 packages (the segments including the Central Artery and its connections to 1-93 North
and the Southeast Expressway), and the system-wide packages. For convenience in examining costs and
the consequence ofpossible reductions, the project has been broken down into eight major components,
five of which comprise the core elements, and three of which are essential connections; (See Figure
2, Cost Allocation Map.)
The Core Elements include:
1. The Artery-Central ~ this is the area between Causeway Street and High Street in downtown
Boston where the existing Artery (six lanes) is elevated on a structure which is both substandard from
a traffic point of view and structurally obsolete. The existing elevated structure is a barrier restricting
the flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic between such important attractions of downtown Boston as
the Faneuil Hall Market Place, and the New England Aquarium, the North End, Rowes Wharf, and other
waterfront areas. These are the key attractions for many if not most of Boston's visiting tourists and
residents seeking entertainment. Both the Market Place and the Aquarium are among the most important
attractions in the region, each drawing in the neighborhood of 3.0 million visitors a year. The plan is to
put this section of the Artery underground in a tunnel system that would have connections to the Sumner
and Callahan Tunnels without disturbing the operation of the Blue Line of the MBTA and provide
surface circulation and protection against noise, dust, and other nuisances to the abutting residents and
commercial establishments during the lengthy construction process. The program calls first for the
construction of "slurry walls' on either side of the existing Artery strong enough to support the existing
structure. Then a "bridge" will be built at the surface to carry the existing roadways. Under this "bridge"
a large trench up to 150 feet deep will be excavated, after all the utility lines have been relocated, into
which the roadway tunnels will be placed. When this is done, the trench will be filled in and the existing
artery structure will be removed. In its place will be an attractive pedestrian-friendly urban boulevard,
park land and sites for new downtown-related development. The extensive tunneling for this section
of the Artery, along with all the other tunnel sections, requires that a number of expensive ventilation
buildings be constructed. The actual cost ofconstruction of this component, for which the engineering
designs are complete, is estimated at $1.5 billion, and the total project cost including utilities, right of
way, engineering and share of management and insurance costs is $2.1 billion, or 20% of the total.
2. The Artery-South — this is the area between High Street and Kneeland Street where the
Massachusetts Turnpike (1-90) currently ends and where the existing Artery runs through the Dewey
Square-South Station Tunnel before emerging on the elevated structure at High Street. The plan is to
realign and expand the existing tunnel to carry southbound traffic and to build a new tunnel under
Atlantic Avenue adjacent to South Station to carry northbound traffic. The construction of the new
tunnel will be deep enough to permit the MBTA's Red Line to operate without interruption and will also
provide the right-of-way for the new South Boston Transitway, a light rail system which will connect
the South Station area with the fast developing commercial areas on the South Boston industrial
waterfront. As with the central section, slurry walls will be constructed and existing roadways
supported by a "bridge" to allow excavation of the trench into which the new north bound roadway will
be placed under Atlantic Avenue. The actual construction cost for this segment, now underway, is
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$ 516 million, and its share of utility relocation, right-of-way, engineering and management costs bring
the total to $826 million or 7.9% of the project total.
3. The I-90/I-93 interchange at South Bay -- this is the key intersection on the CA/T system, for it
is designed to provide the interchange that will allow North-South traffic moving on 1-93 to interchange
with the East-West traffic moving on 1-90 (the Mass Pike) and connecting through the Ted Williams
tunnel to Logan Airport. The interchange will make it possible for people and goods coming from the
south and west of downtown Boston — the location of well over half the population and businesses of
the metropolitan region - to by-pass the Central Artery and the Sumner and Callahan tunnels in travel
to the airport and the North shore. Without this interchange, the CA/T traffic scheme will not work.
The plan is very complicated, for it requires a series of tunnels, viaducts and entrance and exit ramps
operating at five different levels. This requires tunneling under the Fort Point Channel, the South Station
railroad facilities and MBTA's Red Line, traversing an area of very poor soil conditions, and a highly
sensitive environment. It is one of the most difficult engineering design problems anywhere on the U.S.
Interstate Highway system. The plan required very intricate alignment design to avoid creating problems
for the Gillette Company, home to one of the region's most important industries, and to provide safe
and sensitive access to the Chinatown community, one of the treasures of downtown Boston. As a
result, this intersection will be the single most costly construction of the entire CA/T system, requiring
a set of interconnecting tunnels, viaducts and ramps crossing existing railroad lines, subway tunnels and
a waterway. Actual construction, now underway, is estimated to cost $2.0 billion, with about 42%
of all costs to design and relocate utilities and 32% of all engineering design costs going into this piece
of the project. With its share of management and other costs allocated, the total for the South Bay
interchange will be $3.1 billion, or close to one third (29.6%) of the total CA/T project cost.
4. The South Boston tunneling and interchange — this piece of the project connects the South Bay
interchange with the Ted Williams Tunnel under Boston Harbor, through a series of cut and cover
tunnels. It also includes the haul road through South Boston, which has been built and is in operation
to by-pass truck traffic around the South Boston residential community. When completed, the planned
interchange, with new surface streets in what has been a relatively inaccessible part of the industrial and
commercial area of the South Boston peninsula sandwiched between downtown Boston and Logan
airport, will be brought into a development mode offering important possibilities for new economic
development related to these key activity centers. This development process has already begun. Actual
construction cost for these parts of the system is $ 887 million. However, the right- of- way acquisition
and the complicated designs required to connect with local streets and the South Boston Transitway
made the allocation of these costs to the project somewhat higher than for other segments of the
program. Total costs are estimated at $1.23 billion or 11.8% of total project cost.
5. The Ted Williams Tunnel - this tunnel has already been constructed and is in limited operation,
pending completion of the South Boston and South Bay interchange portions of the system. It also
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represents the lowest cost of any of the eight project components. The tunnel itself cost $327 million
to put into place, and with the other allocations, the total cost of this section of the system is $421
million, only 4.0% of total project cost. This is the only portion of the project that did not disrupt an
existing neighborhood. Only the harbor floor, home to important fish species, had to be protected.
The three essential connections include:
1. The ANOC connections (the Area North Of Causeway Street) - this piece of the project
provides the connections ofthe underground portion of the Central Artery and Sumner-Callahan tunnels
with the existing Interstate 1-93 north of the Charles River via a new bridge, with Storrow Drive at
Leverett Circle via new tunnels snaking around and under the North Station and the Fleet Center area,
and with Route 1 and the Tobin Bridge via ramps to the City Square tunnel in Charlestown. This part
of the project, which is still in the final design stage, has proven to be the most controversial Before the
current plan was decided upon and approved by all concerned, there was a significant delay in the whole
project schedule as the design process went ahead. Despite the extensive and expensive efforts to
handle the environmental and esthetic concerns of the impacted communities, there are still law
suits pending on this section of the project According to many observers, the delay in obtaining
consensus on this segment added important costs to the program through inflation and additional project
elements. The centerpiece of the ANOC program will be an elegant single stay suspension bridge
designed to carry 1-93 traffic across the Charles River. However, this is not the most costly piece of the
program. This honor is reserved to a complicated series of tunnels, ramps and viaducts needed to
provide the Storrow Drive- Route 1 and the Sumner-Callahan tunnels connections. Actual construction
of this system is estimated to cost $801 million, with a total cost of $1,354 billion including the
sizeable costs of design and associated utility relocation. This represents 12.9% of total project cost,
the third largest of the eight components of the CA/T project.
2. The Mass. Avenue connections — this piece of the project provides a new viaduct to connect the
South Bay entrance of the Central Artery with the Southeast Expressway where it intersects with Mass.
Avenue at the big bend. It is probably the least complicated section of the entire CA/T project, for it
requires no tunneling and uses existing rights of way through an area with less economic and
commercial activity than other areas. The total cost for the section, now well underway, is $369 million
or only 3.5% of the total, of which $255 million is actual construction.
3. The East Boston connections ~ this project involves connecting the Ted Williams Tunnel, which
emerges in the Logan Airport terminal area, with Route 1A in East Boston, the major highway serving
the adjacent North Shore communities. It is a complicated interchange involving not only connections
with the airport's terminal access roadways, but also present and future transit improvements to the
MBTA's Blue Line, including a new airport station. The engineering for these connections has not
reached the final design stage. Currently these components are estimated to cost $1,074 billion, or
10.3% of the total, of which $774 million is in actual construction.
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Part 3. THE BUDGET FOR MITIGATION
Scattered throughout the budgets allocated to the projects in these eight areas are substantial sums
tor mitigation. The word "mitigation" is defined as "the lessening in force or intensity of
harshness or pain" resulting from a particular action. The term is most appropriate in the case of
the "urban surgery" now being performed in the center of the Boston region as the Central
Artery/Tunnel project moves ahead. Mitigation is and has been a critical element not only in the
planning and design scheme but also in its overall execution.
The cost of mitigation can be viewed as the funds used to plan and build the highway system which
would not have been required if the highway were not built in such a difficult location. Indeed, one
can view the difference between the $2,564 billion initial estimate of 1985 and the $10.4+ billion in
the Finance Plan as attributable mainly to mitigation. Note that virtually all the elements of additional
cost are either related to scope changes designed to protect and enhance the urban and natural
environment or to the time taken to work out the details of the over 2,000 environmental mitigation
commitments resulting from the detailed planning, design and engineering process. (See Table 2 in
Chapter 1
.) During latter stages of the planning and design process, the original 2,000 environmental
mitigation measures proposed were negotiated down to about 1,500.
For practical budgetary purposes, project management estimates that the cost for mitigation measures
has ranged from $2 billion to more than $3 billion, or nearly one third of the total project cost. (See
Table 2.7.) Within the context of the project's implementation, these measures fall into two broad
types: operational and end-result mitigation. Operational mitigation measures include those taken
during the project construction phase, such as traffic staging, general construction mitigation (noise
and dust), keeping the elevated artery in operation during construction, and some ecology-related
environmental mitigation such as the fish warning system used during underwater tunnel work. End-
result mitigation includes measures with a more permanent effect, including environmental protection,
communityjob training, archaeological/historical preservation, and measures taken to improve some
aspect of transportation, pedestrian activity, and neighborhood aesthetics. They also include projects
such as Spectacle Island, the South Boston Haul Road, and the reclamation of the Charles River
banks for park purposes. A number of these projects were required for the project to pass essential
environmental reviews as well as to secure needed funding and political support. They also
underscore largely unquantified future benefits that an area can gain from project mitigation measures.
Some mitigation measures fall into both the operational and end-result categories.
Altogether, MHD has formed a classification of these mitigation components. (See Table 2.8)
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Table 2.7- Mitigation Cost Breakdown - $Cost in Millions
Operational
(Temporary
Accommodations)
City of Cambridge $81.7
ROWARS (right of way acquisition &' remediation) S80
Northern Avenue ramp $8.-
South Boston Haul Road $68
Police Details $66
Impacts south of causeway $60
Right of way $57.8
Transport of clay to municipal landfills $52
Premium for Excavated Material $50
Rodent Control $5
Replacement parking for tour buses $5
Spectacle Island Dirt Disposal System $45
Fire Test program $44
Temporary traffic relief- South Bay $44
Cost to keep Artery open $400
Temporary barricades, walkways and lights for $40
vehicular and pedestrian traffic
Improvements to affected streets and walkways $37
Atlantic Avenue Bypass $36
MBTA Parking Garage $35
Improvements in East and South Boston to avoid $260
interference with airport and minimize noise
Red Line underpinning $25
Temporary Tobin Bridge loop ramp (CANA) $20
City of Boston (for traffic planning) $20
Street Sweeping $20
Noise Control $20
Surface Artery traffic management $2
City of Boston Consultant on traffic activity $2
Boston Fire Dept requirements $2
1-93 Northbound bypass $17
Noise Buffer Park $15
Interim ramp - Albany Street $15
Dust Control $10
Snowplowing $10
Community Group training $1.8
Redesign to accommodate Harbor Towers $1.5
Small Business Program $1.3
Fish startle system $1
Dirt removal safety $1
Boston Police Dept requirements $0.8
NE Aquarium walkway $0.4
Total (52% of mitigation cost) $1648.8
End Result
(Improvements)
Redesigned Charles River Crossing -increment $351
over Scheme Z
Charles River Basin Master Agreement $80
Historical Conservation $ 1
3
HOV Lanes $649
Fort Point Channel improvements $5
North End Ferry terminal $3
East Boston Ferry terminal $0.5
Wetlands replenishment $2.5
Long Island restoration $0.5
Tunnel Covers - East Boston $58
Tunnel Covers/Roofs - South Boston $202.6
Spectacle Island Beach Nourishment $8
Mass Ave Interchange $ 1 94
Total (48% of mitigation cost) $1 337.6
Sources: CA/T project memoranda, contract listings, Boston Business Journal. 5/16-22, 1997
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Table 2.8 - CA/T Project Classification of Mitigation components
Air Quality Joint Development Roadway Design Elements
Arts Material Disposal Surface Restoration
Building Design Elements Noise Transportation: bicycle
Construction Mitigation Parks and Open Spaces parking, transit and traffic
Economic Compensation Pedestrian Utilities
Emergency Response Pest Control Vibration
Highway Maintenance and Public Outreach. Process Water
Operations and Signage
Historic Preservation Right of Way
Overall, mitigation practices that have emerged from the project have been dictated by the difficult
urban environment in which the project is being built and the commitments that project sponsors had
to accept as the price of building in this environment. It required intense project-neighborhood
interaction. An extensive community-liaison network is in place to focus on advance notification of
construction activities and related inconveniences. Through this mechanism groups in the affected
communities have significant influence in day-to-day construction operations. The public dimension
of the project involves an array of community based groups ranging from super coalitions like Mass
Move 2000 to smaller groups representing distinct constituencies like the Fort Point artists and
funds for community training. 7
Through the umbrella groups, scores of private and nonprofit organizations have come to play an
important role in project oversight to complement the role played by the legally mandated state and
federal agencies. Specifically, they independently track the 1500 mitigation measures which were the
quid-pro-quo for project acceptance. Changes in these commitments in the name of cost savings can
be expected to raise vehement and substantive protests from these groups.
Cost pressures on the mitigation budgets
While the costs of the end-state mitigation measures are included in the construction program and
have either been built or have funds for them fully fixed and committed, the costs of the operational
mitigation measures are more variable. For the most part, these costs are accounted for in the
specifications for each of the bid packages let out to the construction contracting teams. Now that
the construction process is in full swing, especially in the downtown area, there is more hands-on
experience with the actual field conditions.
The consensus among contractors whom we interviewed is that construction mitigation efforts,
especially those related to abutter concerns, are far more complex and more time consuming than they
expected. Some contractors even expressed the opinion that CA/T and MHD managers should have
done more about dealing with abutter issues earlier in the project planning and design phase. Arguably
the most difficult mitigation-related issue from CA/T and MHD's perspective has involved the
7
SI.525 million was earmarked for community based training in Boston and $.208 million was earmarked for
community based training in Cambridge. The intent of this item is to "provide minorities, women and residents of
the communities impacted by the project with access to job training opportunities associated with the project."
There have been benefits, both political and substantive, from this program. (Source: CA/T Project Construction
Awards List dated December 2, 1996 and MHD Central Artery Training Program: undated flyer; see also April
1997 op-ed piece by Joan Wallace Benjamin, President, Massachusetts Urban League.)
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inherent conflict of interest that exists between business and residential interests. Conflicting needs
mean that the scheduling of work is a delicate balancing act. Businesses prefer to minimize
construction impacts during the daytime in order to keep traffic moving; residents are more
concerned about rninimizing impacts at night to reduce noise.
The origins of this dilemma lie in the unique residential-business mix - where commercial
establishments and households share the same or adjacent structures and neighborhoods a situation
that is typical of significant portions of downtown Boston. Of the eight major project areas, the
business-resident conflict is especially acute in the following neighborhoods:
ANOC: Charles River Park, Long fellow Place, Beacon Hill, Charlestown, East Cambridge,
North End
Artery North: Harbor Towers, Rowes Wharf, Leather District/South Street/Atlantic Avenue
Artery South: Chinatown, South End, Worcester Square, Ellis Neighborhood Group
Fort Point Channel: Loft District, Summer Street
East Boston: Jeffries Point, "8A" Area.
MHD also acknowledges that construction has been noisier and dustier than anticipated. The single
biggest construction impact ofconcern to residents thus far has been noise and noise related activities.
Air quality complaints will increase as dust becomes a more difficult problem during the summer
months, when construction activity picks up and more people are outdoors. Both noise and dust
complaints are likely to increase in the near term, as the pace and quantity ofconstruction accelerates
and diminish in another IViiol years once the project goes underground.
The current construction sequence encourages contractors to do the noisiest work during daytime
hours. If contractors go outside contractual work hour restrictions in order to accommodate
neighborhood complaints, change claims are generated. Information from bothMHD and contractors
indicates that, in order to preserve understanding and goodwill, contractors have generally responded
to direct requests of the communities without putting in immediate change orders. However, the
project's heavy construction phase has not yet begun in earnest in the residential areas that are likely
to experience significant construction impact.8
In anticipation of an increase in noise-related complaints, project managers, contractors, and
community groups have been experimenting with innovative methods for noise niinimization. The
project has also increased its own monitoring and enforcement efforts. Future contract specifications
include tighter restrictions, and there is some community pressure to apply the new restrictions
'Also, project noise limit specifications are set at no more than 5 decibels over the background noise level for the city. Because Boston is so densely
inhabited, the background noise level is fairly high; therefore, contractors can be operating within project noise specifications and still be too noisy from
the community's perspective. The project is so large, pervasive and well-known that it has experienced a "lightening rod" effect in that unrelated
problems in a neighborhood located within its boundaries are attributed to the project. For example, some North End residents recently complained
about dust being generated by the project even though construction had not yet begun in the their particular locale.
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retroactively. Contractors are willing to comply with tighter standards but would expect to be
compensated. Clearly, construction operational mitigation issues contain seeds for upward pressure
00 project costs. The project has negotiated some night work within certain parameters.
According to CA/T- MHD, the end cost to the project of delaying the schedule by not doing
any work at night would be an additional $20-$30 million per month.
Project staff have described the mitigation process as "evolutionary." If this process entails a
continued proactive approach - but one that does not impose additional costs - total mitigation costs
may not increase. Unexpected issues, disputes or aggressive community advocacy as construction
begins in particular neighborhoods or areas could create an upward cost trend. 9
Part 4. SCOPE CHANGES AND IMPLICATIONS
As an essential part of our analysis, we examined the possibilities for cost reduction through changes
in the scope of the project and its various elements, ranging from halting or putting a moratorium on
current construction activities to possible reductions in the size of various components.
A moratorium on construction
If construction were halted now, when close to two-thirds of the funds have been committed, the
region would lose the benefits of the segments already completed and for the next decades traffic
circulation would continue to deteriorate with serious consequences for downtown Boston and the
region as a whole. With construction started on all major components, there is no convenient way to
make the traffic system work with the elements in place already. There would be additional cost
associated with contract close-out and related litigation. As a result:
• The value of the completed investment in the Ted Williams Tunnel would be marginalized
because there would be no convenient connection between it and 1-90. Access to the airport
would be essentially the same as it is today.
• The Central Artery would remain as it is today, but continuing to deteriorate structurally,
becoming less and less safe, and continuing the pollutive and blighting effects on the adjacent
neighborhoods as it does today.
9 A recent Boston Business Journal article (May 16-22, 1 997) recounts the concerns of small business owners impacted by construction, and claims that
the S 1 .3 million set aside for the project's Small Business Program (used for assisting small businesses with promotional materials) in no way compensates
for loss in sales and other revenue. Pressures from this business group may abate once construction moves underground; however, continued revenue losses
and possible building damage caused by underground digging could drive costs upward.
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• Any program to make the improvements later in the next century would cost substantially
more than the $3.8 billion remaining to be committed, given inflation and the re-engineering
that would be required. This option would be close to catastrophic.
Reducing the scope of the remaining elements
We have studied the project management proposals to reduce the scope of remaining elements of
the project, principally by cutting out some ramps and interchange connections and reducing some
travel lane capacity. Nine of these were presented in the Finance Plan of September, 1996, with a
combined reduction of close to $1.4 billion, or about 29% of the remaining construction costs. . The
Finance Plan proposals are discussed below by size of potential reduction.
South Bay Interchange -- eliminating the 1-90/ 1-93 connections — ($500 million) — would involve
eliminating from the construction program currently underway the complicated set of ramps
connecting the two interstate routes. This would result in a situation in which North-South traffic
on 1-93 would not have access to the MassPike or the Ted Williams Tunnel, nor would the 1-90
traffic have access to the Southeast expressway and the Central Artery as it has today. Each Interstate
route would thus serve only through movement, without the convenient possibility to interconnect,
except through local streets. This solution would severely limit the value ofthe whole CA/T program
by restricting the convenient interchange of multi-directional traffic at the key point in the whole
metropolitan highway system. Project management lists the probability of this solution as very low,
probably unacceptable to the Federal Highway Administration, environmental agencies, and the
affected local communities. The re-engineering required would provide major delays in the
construction schedule.
East Boston infrastructure improvements — curtailing the current program — ($350 million) —
would involve rearranging the timetable and design ofthe connectorsjoining the Ted Williams Tunnel
to Route 1A to allow better solutions for the traffic circulation in the whole area north of Logan
Airport. Relocation of the Airport station of the Blue Line is an essential part of the program. At
present, these improvements are included as part of the CA/T project, but some observers feel that
the project should be designed and constructed as part of Massport's program of airport and related
improvements, with a revised and stretched out timetable. Others feel that these improvements should
continue as part of CA/T, to insure that both traffic solutions are in place as soon as possible and
environmental commitments are met. This piece of the project has not yet gone to final design. As
a result, there may still be some room to rearrange some of the project elements and save some cost
to the CA/T project by assigning the construction management to Massport engineering staff and
consultants. However, changing the existing arrangements would only contribute to cost savings if
MPA, MBTA, MHD and the local community could agree on the best way to handle the situation.
ANOC - Leverett Circle - deleting planned intersection improvements - ($200 million) - would
involve keeping the existing configuration of the Leverett Circle intersection, a major congestion
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point at present. The whole area around North Station and the Fleet Center is undergoing major
change at the moment. Plans for handling connections to the Central Artery are an essential piece of
an improvement program which includes building a new tunnel for the Green Line to connect to
Lechmcre and a new Orange Line-Green Line transfer station adjacent to the Artery. Some observers
feel these improvements could be deferred and made part ofa larger program involving improvements
to MBTA's Green Line, while others feel that without these improvements as part of the CA/T
project, this area will continue to be a major traffic bottleneck. Changing the plans at this stage would
be disruptive and require delays to secure new environmental and other approvals.
ANOC - Storrow Drive/ Artery connection — deleting planned connecting tunnels ~ ($ 100 million)
— would involve eliminating the tunnels designed to connect Storrow Drive to the Central Artery and
Sumner-Callahan tunnels. While this connection is made today by the viaduct connecting the Artery
with Leverett Circle in the North Station area, it would be eliminated in the future if the tunnels were
not built. To get to the Artery and the Sumner-Callahan tunnels, Storrow Drive traffic would have
to use local streets. This would create serious traffic problems for the Beacon Hill and West End
communities and would open up controversies which have been long settled in the planning process.
Redesign would hold up the project schedule.
1-90 and 1-93 HOV lanes - deleting planned extra lanes for high occupancy vehicles — ($100
million) — this would involve removing the HOV lanes which were added to the project to provide
more flexibility in the traffic flows to meet the standards for modern urban highways. Some observers
feel the HOV lanes are not workable and not really essential, others feel that to spend so much money
to improve these interstate segments without HOV lanes would be "penny-wise and pound foolish."
Again, a "notice of project change" would be required. FHWA and other supporters of the HOV
system could be counted on to raise serious doubts about the wisdom of the move.
South Boston Interchange — deleting planned access point to seafront area — ($ 50 million) —
would involve deleting the intersection which provides the main new access to the South Boston
seafront area. It would thus hamper new road access to this area and decrease the potential of the
area to handle new economic development. As a result, one of the key land development benefits of
the whole CA/T scheme would be lost, along with the opportunity of this area to contribute more
to the tax base of Boston.
Central Artery - Dewey Square Tunnel ~ deleting planned improvements — ($ 50 million) —
would involve eliminating the project to realign the existing walls in the Dewey Square tunnel to
make for easier and safer traffic movements. This could be done without major schedule impacts, but
would lower the standards for the Central Artery from a traffic flow point of view. Because of tighter
turning and weaving patterns, some element of danger would be added to the new Artery when
completed.
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Central Artery - Ramp R-T — eliminating access to surface streets ~ ($ 25 million) - would
eliminate a ramp now planned for the Atlantic Avenue area; the main effect would be to dump more
traffic onto the local street system in and around South Station and the financial district. That would
not be in the best interests of improving the environment in this important downtown activity center.
ANOC - Charles River Bridge — change bridge design — ($ 10 million) — would cut back on the
aesthetic quality of the single stay suspension bridge crossing the Charles, which would require
opening the environmental review process in the CA/T's most controversial area.
Most of these changes would diminish the ability of the system to function to its most efficient
level, cause more traffic to circulate in local neighborhoods, and bring into question the
approvals for mitigation and environmental protection agreed upon to meet federal and state
regulations and requirements of local communities. As a result, we do not feel that these types
ofscope reductions should be considered, except under the most adverse circumstances. They
would be counter- productive, raise the possibilities of more delay and controversy, and not
be in the best interests of the Commonwealth and the mission ofthe federal highway program.
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CHAPTER 3 -- COST CONTAINMENT/ REDUCTION POTENTIALS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS
With more than 70% of the budget committed, more than 50% obligated, and more than 40%
already disbursed10, there is little opportunity to significantly reduce the overall budget for
the project at this advanced stage.
As pointed out in Chapter 2, reducing the scope of the project would not, in our view, be wise public
policy for it would negate too many of its long term benefits for the traveling public and affected
communities, and create serious legal, administrative and other problems for which the
Commonwealth would have to suffer the consequences. The budget includes extensive commitments
to a wide variety of community and environmental interests, many of whose concerns are protected
by law. While it is likely that the federal funding available in the future will not be of the proportion
expected when the project was conceived in the 1970's and 1980's, there should be enough from
federal sources to help the Commonwealth complete the project within overall budget parameters.
However, as we will discuss in Chapter 5, state and local resources may be required to pay a larger
portion of the costs. Unless there is an unanticipated funding disaster and the project cannot
proceed, we assume that the best course is to complete the project as soon as possible, relying
on tight budget controls and efficient and effective management of the construction process
to insure completion at the lowest possible cost
We have examined the question ofhow much cost saving potential there is in the CA/T project at this
stage, considering that almost all the final engineering designs are complete, construction is more
than 25% complete and most of the remaining 75% is to be put under contract by the end of the year.
We have done this over the last few months through discussions with project management,
construction contractors, oversight agencies, community groups and others. In this chapter, we will
review our findings and conclusions in this regard, first by examining the budget scenarios that appear
likely, and second, by describing cost containment and reduction measures applicable to the
construction process in its current state, as identified through our contacts.
Part 1. -CA/T BUDGET SCENARIOS
Our analysis of the potential to reduce and contain costs is described by the various scenarios under
which the CA/T budget would either expand or decrease.(See Table 3.1) To reduce the overall
budget by a major amount, by 10% or more than $1.0+ billion, (Scenario A), some drastic
actions would be required which would have severe negative consequences. These actions
would include reducing the scope ofthe remaining elements through extensive elimination ofplanned
capacities and interchange movements. This would result in reducing the traffic performance of the
" As of the CA/T Monthly Management Report of March, 1997 — page 17a "Committed" refers to the dollar value of work that has been agreed
to through contract. "Obligated" refers to dollar value of that portion of the work performed under contract; since the work has been performed as
agreed to, the contracting agent has an obligation to pay for the work.
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entire system. Local neighborhood streets would be left to absorb the burden. This would also entail
possible reduction or elimination of mitigation measures already included in the construction
pactntflftS, a situation which could bring on consequent costs and damage claims from community and
environment groups, and contractors. It would also require renegotiation of agreements with federal
agencies and local interests, along with extensive redesign and engineering.
Another possible device to significantly decrease the CA/T budget would be to transfer major scope
elements out of the CA/T program to the budgets of other agencies, such as the Massachusetts Port
Authority (MPA), Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), or the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority (MBTA), and to defer construction until each agency could absorb the
costs. However, this is no real cost saving. It is cost deferral at best, with possible consequent higher
costs at a later date.
At the other extreme, an increase of the budget of 10%+ or more than $1.0+ billion (Scenario
E), could come about with major traumatic incidents in the current construction environment.
This could include extensive delays in the construction schedule caused by any combination of the
following: unfavorable lawsuits, (at least one suit - mainly involving the Central Artery North Area
(CANA) construction program on the Cambridge side of the Charles River - is still pending); major
new scope or mitigation measures not currently planned (possibly resulting from unforeseen problems
with local communities); extensive contractor claims resulting from unresolved disputes; and/or
construction disasters involving very high insurance claims that would ultimately force the CA/T
program to absorb higher insurance premiums. In addition, a local economic downturn might also
possibly force costs above the current plan. None of these possible traumas has yet affected the
project. However, the construction process still has six years more to run.
Keeping the project within current budget parameters (Scenario C) will be no easy task. It will
require continued application of strong cost containment measures and adherence to the construction
schedule, particularly for those construction packages on the critical path. Because of the complicated
sequencing of these packages, it is essential that contractors keep to the planned schedules, for delays
in one package could hold up the work of the next and result in greater overall cost. Staying within
budget parameters will also require that the project maintain its current pattern of construction bids
coming in below office estimates. So far, this pattern (see table 3.2) has been relatively stable, but
some of the largest and most difficult contracts remain to be bid. Also, to accompany this positive
trend, the pattern of change orders submitted and acted on favorably must be kept within the current
budget parameters, and contractor claims kept to the current low rate.
Increases in the current budget in the range of 2% to 4%, or from $ $250 to $450 million,
(Scenario D) could occur with schedule delays and minor problems in the construction process.
In a project of CA/T's magnitude, this level of change is not unusual. Indeed in the process of
reviewing the Monthly Management reports since the beginning of the year, we have noted some
upward movement in the construction budget that reflects some ofthese pressures. Schedule slippage
in any major construction package, particularly those on the critical path, will increase costs, as will
construction problems in tunneling, particularly since some unforeseen soil and utility conditions are
not covered in the construction contracts and change orders would be required. Mitigation measures
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required but unanticipated in the office estimates for critical program packages in downtown Boston
could also exert upward pressure on the costs, In addition, a pattern of future construction bids
consistently higher than the pattern experienced to date would also have the same effect. Higher labor
costs resulting from shortages in key skills could be one possible cause, along with "contractor
overload," resulting in fewer contractors showing up to bid on future contracts.
To achieve an equivalent level of budget reductions in the scale of2% to 4%, or $250 to $450
million, (Scenario B), the project would have to rely principally on measures to avoid all delays
and unanticipated changes in planned scope for all remaining construction packages plus good
luck in completing packages on critical path ahead of schedule. This will require the active
application of as many as possible of the cost saving techniques available to project management and
contractors involved in the construction process. Application of these techniques requires extensive
cooperation among all the "parties at interest", not only the project management and the contractors,
but the Legislature, other state regulatory agencies, and local communities as well.
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Table 3.1 --CA/T BUDGET SCENARIOS
St KYVRIO
A. LEVEL 1
S v\ INGS
B. LEVEL 2
SAVINGS
CCURRENT
BUDGET
(escalated)
D. LEVEL 1
INCREASES
E. LEVEL 2
INCREASES
LEVEL OF
CHANCE
-OVER 10%
•$1.1+ B.
-2% TO 4%
-$250/$450 M.
$10.4+ B.
($11.0 B.)
+ 2% TO 4%
+$250/$450 M.
OVER 10%
+1.0+ B.
PERFORMANCE REQl 1RFMFNTS
WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR SCOPE CHANGES-
--extensive elimination of planned capacities and interchange
movements resulting in reduced system performance
-- extensive elimination of mitigation measures already included
in construction packages (with possible consequent costs and
damage claims)
-- repermitting and renegotiation of agreements with Federal
Agencies and local interests
— transfer major scope out of CA/T program to other agencies
(not real savings)
WOULD REQUIRE SCHEDULE ADVANCES -
— avoid all delays and unanticipated changes in planned scope -
plus luck in completing construction packages on critical path
ahead of schedule
— active application of all cost saving techniques in the
construction process, including faster processing of change
orders and VECP's, bulk purchasing, etc.
— early phase out of project management consultant
WILL REQUIRE STRONG COST AND SCHEDULE
CONTAINMENT -
~ no change orders other than those anticipated to date or
absolutely necessary
— current schedule of critical path items kept without interruption
— no extraordinary patterns of bids exceeding office estimates (so
far, so good)
— claims rate kept to current minimum
~ consideration of change orders and VECP's only with
construction period, rather than long term, impacts
COULD OCCUR WITH SCHEDULE DELAYS AND
MINOR CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS --
— schedule slippage in any major construction package,
particularly those on the critical path
— unforeseen construction problems in tunneling, particularly
with soil, water or utility conditions
— unforeseen mitigation measures required (C15A1 example)
— future construction bids pattern higher than estimates
COULD OCCUR WITH MAJOR TRAUMA
~ extensive delay s caused by unfavorable lawsuits (Cambridge)
— major new scope or mitigation measures not currently planned
— major contractor claims
— planned cost savings unrealized
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Part 2. -MEASURES TO CONTAIN OR REDUCE COSTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS
The setting for cost containment and reduction
At this advanced stage in the construction process, the dynamics of interactions among the "owner,"
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Joint Venture program manager and design/engineering
team, and the construction contractors, along with the affected "communities" will determine the
ability to control, contain, and possibly reduce project costs. The laws of the Commonwealth
governing the construction process for receiving and accepting contract bids; for abiding by labor,
environment, and other regulations; and for resolving disputes among the affected parties, provide
the backdrop for these dynamics. In our discussions with project management staff, construction
contractors, oversight agencies, community groups and others, a series of measures have been
identified that could be introduced or improved upon to help contain and reduce costs in the
construction process. Some of the measures would require action by the state legislature, some upon
the cooperation of other state agencies to improve administrative reviews, but many could be
accomplished through changes in present project management practices. These measures fall into
the following categories:
A. The bidding process for construction contracts
1. expansion of the bidders pool
2. bid acceptance policy
3. the A-B bidding process
4. exemption from filed sub-bid requirements
B. Construction contract management
1. partnering policy
2. change order policy
3. the VECP policy
C. Environmental assistance
1. review process relief
2. soil handling definitions
3. additional landfill sites
D. Other measures
1. police details
2. insurance program
3. approval of plans for vertical construction
This list is not exhaustive; and there may be other cost saving measures identified in the course of
the construction process. However, they are the measures most frequently noted by those actively
engaged in the CA/T construction program at the present time.
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A. The bidding process for construction contracts
The CA/T program Is currently in the most active period of letting construction contracts. While
many contracts have already been let, there are enough remaining to warrant attention to those
factors in the bidding process which can help reduce costs. There are a number of these as described
below
:
1. Expansion of the bidders pool
One of the keys to keeping construction costs under control is to insure that the project continues
to receive the lowest possible bids from construction contractors. So far, the experience with
receiving bids below the office estimates has been good (see table 3.2). However, there is some
concern that this trend will not continue unless the number of new construction contractors expands;
project management has conducted an active program to interest prospective contractors. To date,
most of the lowest bids have been submitted and won by a small group of about 14 prime
contractors. One of these has been involved as a lead or sub contractor on close to half of the
contracts issued. On the one hand, the successful contractors feel that the size of the bidding pool
is adequate. They note that the successful firms are able to handle the complicated demands of the
project, "know the territory," and are able to secure the performance bonds needed to bid.
Furthermore, the community groups most affected by the construction program feel that the
experienced contractors have learned to deal with their concerns, a situation that may not exist with
new construction contractors.
Table 3.2 - Difference between Low Bids and Office Estimates
(by Year of Award, $K)
Year No. of Contracts Total Amount Average Amount
Below Office Per Contract
Estimate
1990 2 (578) (289)
1991 8 (34,353) (4,294)
1992 8 (83,636) (10,455)
1993 12 (72,863) (6,072)
1994 13 (67,264) (5,174)
1995 13 (104,122) (8,009)
1996 13 (64,300) (4,946)
1997 2 40,061 20,030
thru
January
Total 71 (387,055) (5,451)
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CA/T management provided a listing of all bidders at bid openings through April 1, 1997. 11 Table
3.3 shows the bid openings divided into groupings based on the office estimates. Bidding history
shows that the larger the dollar value of contracts, the smaller the group of bidders. Except for
Groups D and E, the number of bidders seems adequate; in these last two groups competition might
be enhanced if future contracts can be divided into smaller pieces. Nearly all the bidders in Group E
were joint ventures. 12
Table 3.3 - CA/T Project Bid Openings
roup Dollar Range # of Bid Openings # of Bids per Opening
A $0-$10M. 43 5.23
B $10 - $50 M. 15 7.50
C $50 - $100 M. 7 4.71
D $100 - $200 M. 7 4.14
E $200 - $450 M. 10 3.50
The project management has initiated a nationwide program to recruit additional prospective
construction contractors in an effort to encourage more bids on the large packages. We have heard
unconfirmed reports, however, that many of the nation's larger highway construction contractors
are not eager to participate in the CA/T program, fearing the difficult challenges of the project will
make it hard to achieve expected margins on the work.
In addition, a potential problem of concern to the contractors and management alike which could
drive up the cost of future bids is a shortage of skilled labor. The amount of CA/T construction now
under conn-act is so massive that most of the skilled labor pool available locally is already employed.
The ability of existing contractors to keep their work force scheduled on successive contracts is an
advantage for their keeping their bids low. If the past pattern of low bids does not hold up in the
future, however, there will be upward pressure on the construction budget.
The situation involving the size and nature of the bidding pool needs careful monitoring on
the part of project management, including measures to insure that incentives remain for
contractors to bid competitively on the program packages yet to be awarded.
11
In the following discussion some figures may not add up exactly due to either variations in the office estimates or missing
figures in the tabulations and also to the fact that some award prices were in one group while the office estimate was in another;
however, the overall figures are approximately correct.
12 Some federal agencies hold to a policy that requires a minimum of three valid bids in order for a bid opening to be
considered valid; otherwise the contract is re-bid.
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2. Bid acceptance policy
Oi equal concern in ihe bidding process is the disparity some CA/T projects have experienced
between the office estimate for a particular construction package and the price of the contract
awarded, especially when the awarded contract is substantially above the office estimate. At present,
we understand that there is no set policy within CA/T for bid acceptance. In the award of military
construction contracts, it is common practice to set a limit on how much the low bid can vary from
the office estimate. Quite often bids that vary by more than 10% from the office estimate are not
awarded until the office estimate is reconciled with the bid received. The bid opening is put on
hold, and the firm that prepared the plans and specifications reviews its cost estimate and the low
bid submitted to detect any causes for the differences. If the differences cannot be successfully
identified and corrected, the bid opening is canceled and the contract is re-bid. This process
provides protection against runaway costs and the award of contracts that are excessive.
In the above listing of CA/T contracts, there are ten contracts awarded where the bid was 20% or
more above the office estimate; in most cases, they were between 20 and 40% higher, with one of
them 3577c higher than the office estimate. Even contracts awarded at bids below the office estimate
are significant since they often can be a harbinger of excessive change order demands later on. In
the above groupings there are thirty-four contracts awarded at prices that were more than 20%
bbelow the office estimate and another fourteen that were between 10 and 20% below the office
estimate.
In view of the detailed and costly engineering efforts of the project management and the
section designers to create solid plans and specifications, this situation appears to warrant
careful evaluation with tightened procedures, if necessary. Consideration should be given
before contract award to reviewing the reliability of the office estimate and the low bid on any
contract that falls outside a 10% parameter of the office estimate.
3. The A-B bidding process
The Massachusetts Highway Department (MHD) wants to use an alternative method ofconstruction
bidding, called A-B bidding, as a schedule optimization measure on discrete CA/T project segments
that interface and are on the critical path. The MHD believes they could do this under existing law,
Chapters 30 and 149 of the Massachusetts General Laws. On November 6, 1996, the State
Attorney General sustained a bid protest against A-B bidding on the grounds that Chapters 30 and
149 did not allow it; the Superior Court upheld the Attorney General's ruling.
In order to use A-B bidding, MHD has submitted a bill, H. 1 17, that would authorize its use, as well
as other alternative methods of construction such as design-build, turnkey, etc.13 The bill directs
13 The design/ build option - The laws of the Commonwealth governing public construction mandate that there be a clear cut "division of labor and
responsibility" between the designer/engineer who determines the scope and specifications for a project and the contractor who builds it. This process
involves some duplication of costs in the design process and sometimes prevents the designer from having the benefit of a construction contractor's
knowledge of technique and the contractor from having the ongoing benefit of the designer's skills. This is a problem in a complicated project like the
"big dig" where there are so many unknowns in the process of building underground in an old urban environment that it is hard for the designer to
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MHD to procure a sufficient number of contracts using such alternatives to permit evaluation of
their effectiveness in terms of time and cost savings. A report must be filed with the Joint
Committee on Transportation and the House and Senate Committees on Ways and Means along with
recommendations by June 30, 1999.
In A-B bidding, bidders submit the sum of items contained in the Schedule of Quantities and Prices
as their "Total Estimated Contract Price" (Part A). Bidders also submit the number of days
(between and 100), prior to the contract completion date specified in the bid invitation package,
within which they will complete performance of the work. The number of "saved" days is
multiplied by a value calculated by MHD for each saved construction day to arrive at an
"Adjustment for Days Saved" (Part B). The Adjustment for Days Saved is subtracted from the
Estimated Contract Price to arrive at the "Proposal Price."
The bidder submitting the lowest Proposal Price wins the contract bid. However, the successful
bidder will be paid the Total Estimated Contract Price. Should the successful bidder fail to perform
within the time in the contract, he/she will be assessed liquidated damages for each saved day that
is delayed or not realized. Under this bidding method, a successful bidder may riot necessarily have
the lowest Total Estimated Contract Price among the bidders. A-B bidding would be used only for
work on the project critical path.
Saving days will save money. Money would be saved because the project that next interfaces
can start earlier. No overall cost savings can be estimated, however, because there has been
no public construction experience with A-B bidding in Massachusetts, although it has been
used in other jurisdictions.
Several contractors who were interviewed strongly opposed A-B bidding because they believe it is
vulnerable to fraud. In fact, Construction Industries of Massachusetts (CIM) was the plaintiff in a
recent case before the Superior Court. The contractors argue that a contractor, in order to get CA/T
contracts, will bid an unrealistic number of days saved. After winning the contract, the contractor
will do anything to insure that failure to achieve days saved cannot be blamed on him to avoid
liquidated damages. If CIM' s argument proves to be true, no savings would accrue by this method,
and, indeed, could cost the project and the taxpayer more. At this stage, however, there is no hard
evidence to support this contention. Enactment of a new law by the Legislature is needed to
authorize A-B bidding; it should be enacted as soon as possible, considering the considerable
number of construction contracts to be let this calendar year.
know what to specify in the designs and hard for the construction contractor to formulate a realistic bid. To solve this problem nationwide and to
possibly reduce the costs of major public projects, the engineering/construction industry along with "public owners" have been using a new practice
called "design/build" which breaks down this division of labor by allowing a construction project to accept bids from contracting organizations which
will combine both the final engineering design and the construction in the same construction contract, thus saving costs in both the design and
construction process. While this blurs responsibility somewhat and could remove from the owner the protection offered by an independent
engineer/designer who can represent him during the construction process, it is being actively considered by many public agencies as a means of
reducing costs on expensive public works project. For the CA/T program, the laws and practices of the Commonwealth did not allow this method to be
tried and at this stage of the project with virtually all final designs complete, its use as a cost saving technique is largely academic.
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Since CA/T management believes this would encourage bids which would help the overall
project schedule and thereby save cost, it deserves consideration. A discrete test period should
be authorized to disprove or prove the arguments for A-B bidding. The law should expire at
the end of the test period, June 30, 1999. If test results prove the value of A-B bidding, the
law authorizing the same could be made permanent.
4. Exemption from filed sub-bid requirements
The Ward Commission in 1980 recommended the repeal of the filed sub-bid law; however, their
recommendation was never followed. There are significant potential savings to the CA/T
project if the Legislature suspends the filed sub-bid provisions of Chapter 149 as it applies to
the project The savings might be in the order of $10 million.
Under Massachusetts law, the selection of sub-contractors on public construction of buildings (so
called "vertical construction") must be done independently of the selection of the general contractor.
This provision applies to sub-contractors involving some 17 different crafts, including electricians,
plumbers, painters, installers of elevators, heating and air-conditioning and others. The subcontractors
file separate bids which are opened two days before the general contractors' bids are opened. The
general contractors must then select one of the sub-bidders. With essentially no time to check the sub-
bidders qualifications and performance potentials and with their costs added to their own, the general
contractors almost always select the lowest bidder. Thus, as a practical matter, the general contractor
has no significant role in selecting subcontractors and little leverage in coordinating and enforcing
the quality and timeliness of their performance.
Although most of the CA/T project involves "horizontal" construction (tunnels and viaducts) to
which filed sub-bid provisions do not apply, the provisions do apply to the ventilation buildings
required as part of the tunnel components. Because they are integral parts of tunnel construction and
operation, there is no particular reason that they should not be included directly in the construction
packages for the tunnels, except for the provisions of the filed sub-bid requirement. There are more
vent buildings required in the CA/T project than in any other similar project built in the U.S. The
need to accept filed sub-bids on these projects has already had a negative effect in project costs. 14
Of the eight called for in the plan, only three remain to be bid. Their estimated cost is $97 million.
A reasonable estimate is that the filed sub-bid provisions will directly add about 10% to the bids for
these packages. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) sought a similar exemption for
the Boston Harbor project, after having the results of a study by Cambridge Systematics which
estimated that from 7.5% to 11.5% would be added to the contracts to which the filed sub-bid
provisions would apply. 15
14
Project management reported that there have been the predicted difficulties with this procedure. Sub-contractors procured
in this way often did not show up to work on their project, a situation which required the MHD staff to track down the subs
and bring them to the work site. In other instances, the low bids received (for roofing and elevator installation, for example)
were close to double the office estimates for the work and required substantial redesign and schedule delays . Had the bids
been part of the prime contractor's responsibility, they would have been more in line with project requirements.
In interviews with contractors, Cambridge Systematics found that they increased their bids by up to 9% on projects
involving filed sub-bids. The bids are increased by up to 3% to account for the higher management costs (about 15%) of
working with subcontractors with whom they have not previously worked to cover extra field personnel, extra meetings, and
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In addition, there is a strong possibility that the work contracted by this method will contribute to
potential schedule delays, particularly for projects on the critical path. Since the prime contractor
with responsibility for the overall schedule, has little leverage over the subs (who are in effect hired
by the "owner"), the completion schedule is often at the mercy of the subs who may demand more
money (in the form of change orders) to keep to the prime's schedule. On a project with critical
time pressures, it is much more efficient to have the prime contractor in complete control of the
work schedule and performance as would be the case if the filed sub-bid procedure were not in
force.
The filed sub-bid procedure is defended by subcontractors who fear that prime contractors will wait
until they have a contract award, then use their considerable leverage to shop around for the best
possible price. Many of the construction trade unions also support the system in order to protect
themselves from the possibility of work being given to non-union subs. Since all CA/T contracts
are covered by labor agreements that specify all work to be done at union wage rates, the fear of
subcontractors being hired at below union wage is minimal. Nonetheless, there is a long standing
alliance between some of the craft unions and the subcontractors to insure hiring their members,
a situation which the filed sub-bid systems helps protect. Under the proposed plan union wages
would still be paid, with the prime contractors controlling the process. However, they may not be
held necessarily to the boundaries between crafts as defined by the craft unions.
The potential savings to the CA/T program from this exemption are possible only if the
Legislature acts within the new few months to suspend the provisions of Chapter 149 as they
apply to the CA/T project (Such action has already been taken by the legislatures of
Connecticut and New York which repealed their equivalents to their filed sub/bid
requirements.) Ifsuch an exemption were also applied to the construction of the Logan 2000
plan, savings to the Commonwealth could be substantial. We recommend that the Legislature
act to allow this exemption-at least on a trial basis-a move supported by CA/T management
and the other affected agencies.
B. Construction contract management
This is an area in which the CA/T management, MHD, FHWA, and the oversight agencies have
made a major effort since the beginning of the heavy construction period in the early 1990's. The
project management team has tried to anticipate difficult construction situations by learning from
the past. However, there are three interrelated policies and applications which are the most critical
to the ability of the project to contain and possibly reduce costs. These are partnering policy,
change order policy, and value engineering change proposals policy. All these are the
responsibility of the program management team.
more intense monitoring of their work. In addition, up to 4% is added to the bidder's contingency allowance to
cover the problems of working with up to 17 different subcontractors, potential delays, disputes between the subs,
resolving gaps and overlaps in work assignments and others.
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1. Partnering policy
The construction industry has experienced an unprecedented growth in claims and litigation over
the past ten to twenty years. Disputes inevitably involve the owners and their representatives (the
project manager and section designers) and the many contractors and sub-contractors on the job.
Conflicts also arise between general contractors and their subs. Unresolved disputes fester and grow
into work stoppages, ultimately leading to litigation with consequent work slow downs and
disruption of schedules, poor morale and, not surprisingly, poorer safety records. All these effects
result in additional costs.
There are a number of techniques which can help reduce the costly effects of the division of
responsibility among the owner-project manager, engineer/designer, and construction contractor.
One that has been used extensively by the CA/T project is "partnering", a method of putting the
program manager and the successful contractor into a working relationship to avoid the
confrontational disputes that result in costly claims and project delays. Both project management
and contractors credit the partnering program for the exceptionally low claims experience
on the CA/T program to date.
In 1992, the Massachusetts Highway Department (MHD) decided to try "Partnering" on the Central
Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) Project, challenging all companies that were part of the project to pledge that
they would promote cooperation among all parties for their mutual benefit. 16 In the CA/T project
partnering, a concept meant to mitigate the typically adversarial relationship among construction
parties, is incorporated at four levels:
—Contract Partnering
-Inter-Contract Partnering
—Internal Partnering
—Partnering with Community Groups
Contract Partnering involved bilateral agreements between Contract Management teams (FHWA,
MHD, B/PB) and the Section Designers during the design phase of the project or with the General
Construction Contractors during the construction phase. Third parties were invited to participate
in each of these phases and included organizations such as MPA, MBTA, Sub-Contractors, etc.
Inter-Contract Partnering was initiated by the CA/T Area Construction Managers as a multi-
lateral agreement among the Construction Contract Management Team (FHWA, MHD, B/PB),
usually at the area management level and two or more general construction contractors working in
confined or adjacent areas. Third parties may participate but generally the agreement is to focus the
parties on ways to coordinate their work activities and to accomplish their respective contracts with
minimum interference from one another. When applicable, normal construction Contract Partnering
is used to interface with interested third parties.
16 'Partnering" is an alternative for doing business where all the parties make long term commitments to achieve common goals. It was
introduced to the construction industry by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers back in 1988 and is rapidly becoming part of every major
construction project undertaken in the United States today.
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Internal Partnering has many forms. Most include the Contract Management Team (FHWA,
MHD, Joint Venture), although some are limited to MHD-Joint Venture or to internal problems of
the Joint Venture partners. In these cases, the purpose of these agreements is to improve and
streamline the internal working relationships.
Partnering with community groups -- The policy of encouraging partnering among community
and institutional groups, construction contractors, CA/T management, and MHD has resulted in
benefits to mitigation. Since the mitigation measures are included in the construction cost estimate
and bidding packages, there has been agreement in advance which has reduced the level of potential
major change orders and claims. Some major contractors have been exceptionally receptive to
working with community groups to accommodate complaints and maintain good will without
holding up a contract or putting in immediate change orders. If this pattern continues, it will help
cost containment efforts.
Construction contractors interviewed for this study indicated they felt they were dealt with fairly as
a result of the application of CA/T's partnering policy. Although, in some cases, a contractor may
not have liked the resulting decision or agreement, the opportunity to state his case was there. We
were told by several contractors that all disputes had been settled without resorting to litigation. With
over twenty five percent of the dollar value of construction completed to date, the fact that no dispute
has gone to litigation is important.
There are some who argue that partnering agreements, while promoting cooperation and progress
among contractors, are being accomplished by CA/T management leaning towards over generous
claims settlements and that the project might be better off in terms of overall cost if some contractor
claims were litigated . 17 There is some concern within CA/T management as to whether partnering
does result in additional cost. Some believe the relationship is too relaxed. However, given the
essential priority of the overall project schedule and the problems that delays caused by litigation on
one contract could have on related interlinked construction, it is too soon to tell whether the
partnering approach is causing unnecessary cost escalation. So far, progress is made and
disagreements are amicably resolved so that construction is proceeding with minimal delay.
CA/T management estimates that a one day delay of a contract on the critical path is a setback
worth approximately $800,000 to the owner. According to both management and the
contractors, the priority put on the partnering arrangements plays a key role in preventing
delays by avoiding job stoppages. It helps with the essential goal of the CA/T program to
complete critical jobs on or ahead of schedule.
Some senior management personnel of other Boston area authorities are known to have their reservations about Partnering. One commented,
"I don't like it. it's like letting the contractor put his hands in your pockets."
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2. Change order policy
Reducing the rate of change orders (expressed as a percentage of original contract bid value)
represents the largest potential for costs savings within the CA/T project. With remaining
construction amounting to about $4.0 billion, a reduction ofchange order costs ofjust from one
half of one to one percent would mean potential saving of from $20 to $40 million.
Project management has established a target for change order allowances above the contract bid price
of 10.7%. This target is reflected in the 1996 Finance Plan and has been approved by the FHWA. It
represents an important reduction from the 24% that the project experienced on some of its earlier
construction contracts. In response to concerns expressed by oversight agencies and to reflect the
current project management effort on cost containment, a task force has been created by project
management to focus on these issues. 18
There are two major causes for change orders;
• Unanticipated site conditions — a major problem in the areas where underground excavation
and tunnel construction plans are being implemented in downtown Boston in the areas that were
once part of the harbor and subsequently filled in and loaded with utility lines of different sorts.
• Unanticipated mitigation measures — particularly those requested by agencies, businesses
and community groups to protect adjacent streets and neighborhoods from noise, dust and
vehicular and pedestrian traffic hindrances during the construction process.
While the extensive planning and engineering work anticipated most of these problems, which were
reflected in cost estimates and subsequent contract bids, there will inevitably be changes once the
construction process is underway.
There are a number of measures suggested by project management staff, by contractors, and others
experienced with Massachusetts construction laws and practices, that can be examined and
implemented by project management and others to help reduce the impact on the project budget by
change orders.
18
The task force includes the senior managers in charge of construction for the Joint Venture, along with representatives of MHD and FHWA
and the MHD Director of Design and the Construction Contract Administration Manager.
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A "deductible" for change orders
To date the CA/T project has processed about 3,000 change orders. Of these, 91% have involved sums
of less than $250,000, and half of these less than $15,000. A relatively few large change orders
account for most of the money involved. The 9% of change orders over $250,000 account for 84%
of the total change order cost.
Processing change orders involves costs not only to the project management staff but to the contractor
as well, and delays can hold up the overall project schedule. 19 Eliminating the processing of smaller
change orders (of $25,000 or less) could eliminate a significant portion of processing expense. By
raising the limit to $100,000 (which represents about one-fifth of one percent of a typical CA/T
contract), much more processing cost could be saved. This could be done by advertising future
contracts with a clause which would make the contractor liable for the first $100,000 of any change
order. The requirement would not only avoid processing costs but also provide an incentive for the
contractor to perform the actual work for less. Change orders are now paid for on a pre-determined
cost of time and materials basis 20 and are almost always completed before changes are finally
approved. Switching to a fixed cost for the smaller changes should create pressure to get the job done
quickly and efficiently and avoid problems caused by approval procedures. If some protection is
needed for contractors with this procedure, a larger deductible of, say, $ 100,000 could be limited only
to those claims initiated by the contractor himself. The claims for changes initiated by the "owner"
could be limited to a smaller amount, say $25,000. It would also be possible to set a dollar limit on
the absolute number of owner-initiated claims to which the exemption applies (for example, one claim
for every $2.5 million of contract value). It is important that the deductible amount, at whatever level,
be subtracted from the amount paid on all claims, including those that exceed the set limits, so that
there is no incentive to elevate, for example, a $90,000 claim to $101,000.
There are unconfirmed reports that the U.S. Department of Defense has been experimenting with this
approach with some success. In their case, all claims for changes up to 1% of total contract value are
absorbed by the contractor. In the case of the CA/T project, it is possible that some legislation may
be required (section 39N of Chapter 30). CA/T project management is working on specific proposals
19 One CA/T resident engineer visited by our team bad 92 change orders to date in bis project, of which 73 were contractor initiated which amounted to less than
$300,000 on what will be a $70 million job. The remaining 27 were valued at about $5.0 million. However, the time and effort required to process both the large
and the small claims were not in proportion to the sums involved.
20
The use of pre-determined unit costs for required changes has generally been popular with the construction contractors for it allows them to bid
a contract with a good notion of how much they can be paid for unanticipated changes. However, there is often a great deal of complexity in auditing
the quantities involved, and there is some incentive for contractors to under bid the unit costs of items they think will be used in smaller quantities
than contained in the office estimates. If more quantity is needed, the argument is for "changed conditions" and unit prices in excess of those bid are
sought This situation undercuts the "ease of administration" rationale for unit cost changes. The use of unit cost requires the contractor's honest
application of the unit price provision. In many contracts bid as lump sum (L.S.), it is often necessary for the owner to go back to the low bidders and
request unit prices to help the owner when making progress payments. In contracts bid with unit prices, bids submitted using unusually high or low
unit prices in hopes of making a "killing" are termed "unbalanced bids". It is usually the responsibility of the office reviewing the bid prices - in this
case the Section Designer - to detect this "unbalance" and to reject the bid when it appears purposely designed to "make a killing." Contracts bid with
honest unit prices are easier to administer and end up saving money for the owners.
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in this regard which we believe should be given support.
Unit pricing generally saves time and effort in processing change orders by making it an up
front element of the contract bid. The deductible concept should be tested before being applied
across the board.
Other administrative measures
There are other measures noted by project management, construction contractors, and others which
could improve the change order process. These include the following:
• Strengthening contract language — by stating contractor responsibility with more precision,
removing clauses related to general desires and not to specific results, and consolidating
sections with overlapping requirements. This language is reviewed annually by project
management based on experience and should help tighten the change order process.
• "No damages for delay" ~ The standard CA/T contract allows for the recovery of additional
money, as well as time, for those delays caused by the "owner" (MHD). While Massachusetts
law allows public agencies to include clauses which allow contractors to have additional time
for delays not caused by them, but without more money, this provision has not yet been used
by CA/T. Given that the project now has a track record of experience on which to build
contractual requirements, this type of provision might well be considered.
• Optimizing the benefit from contractual provisions - The project's Change Order Task
Force is tightening the directions given to resident engineers to undertake more stringent
enforcement of material, technical, and safety requirements of specifications and to ensure that
contractors are meeting their required quality control responsibilities, as well as notice of
claims, proposal submissions, and document requirements. In this context, they have been
instructed to consider "the most reasonable" interpretation of contract provisions, rather than
to accept, in general, the contractor's position if it was reasonable. Now accepting the
contractor's position will be done if it is the "most reasonable" interpretation of a specific
provision of the contract.
• Improve the independent assessment process — In the final analysis, the estimate of what
a change order proposal is worth rests with the independent assessment prepared by the CA/T
project control staff. However, the Field Contract Administrator also prepares an assessment.
In instances our team had a chance to review, the assessment coming from the Field
Administrator (often with better knowledge of the specific situation) was about twice as high
as that of the independent assessment. This situation makes it difficult for the project to have
a unified position vis-avis the contractor in final negotiations over the change order value.
Clarification of the communications links in this procedure should help the quality of the
resulting decisions.
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• Simplify paperwork requirements ~ In our discussions with contractors, one consistent
complaint involved the volume of paperwork they were required to prepare to document
change order requests. To contractors, it appears that there are too many people in project
management required to handle and sign off on change orders. Project management is
currently taking steps to improve this situation, to reduce costs both to the contractor and
project management. One of the construction contractors interviewed said that he was
"drowning in overhead." He stated that on one specific job he had to add thirty (30) persons
to his staff to handle the paperwork and manage the interchange of schedules, meetings, etc.
that he or others on his staff were required to attend or participate in to meet contract
requirements. These are thirty persons who do not do any of the required construction work,
but do only the required paperwork called for under the contract.
3. The Value Engineering Change Proposals Policy
During the period of the work on final engineering design from 1991 through 1995, project
management also instituted another cost reduction technique called "value engineering". This method
required final design engineers to hold to a specific construction budget once their designs have
reached 75% completion, then submit the designs to a peer review panel which reviews them for
possible cost reduction. Project management claims that this process produced important savings of
close to $500 million21 in the specifications for the construction packages (See table 3.3).
Table 3.3 - Savings from Value Engineering To Date
Value Engineering No. of Total Savings
Recommendations $K
Design Phase 27 477,880
Construction Phase 63 (to date ) 13,000
Total 490,880
In the construction phase, Value Engineering Change Proposals (VECPs) provide an
opportunity for the construction contractor to submit ideas for cost savings and for
acceleration of a construction project, and to share in the cost savings with the
Commonwealth, often on a 50 - 50 basis. To be effective, a VECP program must be fair and
comprehensive in its review and speedy in its execution. According to the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, a good VECP program should be capable of realizing an overall savings of 6
to 8 percent of the project construction cost. With $4 billion in construction remaining to be
put in place, savings can amount to more than $200 million dollars, half of which would be
returned to the owner (MHD).
21
It should be noted that a number of the oversight agencies including the Commonwealth's Inspector General and the Federal GAO have been
critical of the CA/T value engineering program, claiming that more savings might have been achieved for the Commonwealth if more VE proposals
had been adopted before construction contracts were let.
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There are a number of important characteristics of this procedure:
• By submitting a VECP, a construction contractor expects the owner will consider
approving a modification in the project specifications, construction materials and/or
techniques with the belief that such changes will improve the overall project, reduce costs
and possibly speed the completion of work.
• Construction contractors can profit both in time and in dollars by submitting and executing
workable VECP proposals. VECPs can enhance a construction contractor's reputation
when, having submitted one or more executable VECPs he/she shows superior
construction skills, higher productivity and a creative approach to constructing facilities
and produces a better, more durable facility with lower life cycle costs.
• While there is no real opposition in principle to an effective VECP program, there is the
potential for professional friction in its execution. The Section Designers who develop
plans and specifications can be embarrassed when a VECP raises the question of why the
section design did not anticipate the solution in the first place. There is always the
possibility that VECPs will point out a limited and unimaginative design approach and/or a
reluctance of a design firm to accept new design and construction approaches. If good
VECPs are rejected for these reasons, then the project and the owner suffer and incur the
burden of the costs which could have been saved, the time that could have been saved, and
the improved quality of the facility that could have been constructed.
Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) managers report that, with about one quarter of construction
contracts completed to date, overall VECP savings on 63 VECPs submitted through March ,1997,
total about one half of one percent (or about $13 million). This relatively low amount of savings
was explained in interviews with representatives of construction firms and officials from the
Construction Industries of Massachusetts (CIM); they attributed the poor recovery to problems and
complaints to the makeup and procedure of the VECP program.22 Contractors submit preliminary
proposals to the Resident Engineer outlining the idea (with as many drawings as necessary to
illustrate the proposed change) and the potential cost savings. If the Resident Engineer believes a
proposal is worth further consideration, he may ask that the VECP be developed further by the
construction contractor or, if he feels unable to make a preliminary evaluation of the merit of the
proposed change, he may send it on to a higher level of review.
Usually, the latter process applies. If the higher level of review sees the worth of the proposal,
the construction contractor can enter into an agreement with project management for sharing
design and other costs necessary to prepare a fully developed submission or, in some cases, costs
may be paid fully by project management. However, the amount of detail required, according to
contractors, and the number of times that additional information is requested by the review team,
is so great that much precious time can be consumed - and the contractor cannot stop his
operation while evaluation proceeds. 23
" CA/T VECP procedures were criticized earlier by the Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General (IG) in its report "Value Engineering Change
Proposals: dated December, 1996. As a result, the Massachusetts Highway Department, through its Project Manager issued Revision 5 to the CA/T
"Project Procedures No. 1213." Because there was an interactive exchange of findings and recommended actions between the IG and the Project
Office, the Project Procedure (PP) was issued and became effective on June 6, 1 996 before the IG report actually was distributed. Although this
Project Procedure corrected many of the older problems with the VECP program, the system remains complicated and is not yet completely effective
50
Some contractors believe that section design representatives on the evaluation and review team often
hesitate to approve a VECP because it may reflect poorly on the section designer. " If it was any good
it would have been included in the plans and specifications" and, " it will embarrass us if we go along
with it because we didn't think of it" is what construction contractors believe underlies prolonged
reviews and rejections by VECP committees. Sometimes the concern is understandable, especially
when a section designer has no experience in the area where a change is proposed. u .
In some cases, section designers have been accused of deliberately changing plans and specifications
and issuing change orders when a VECP has been submitted so as to avoid approving the VECP, and
thus render it no longer viable. The excuse usually is that the designer was never happy with that
particular part of the design and now has had the opportunity to correct it. This deprives the
contractor of his share of the savings, and also eliminates any potential savings for the State.
To turn a VECP program which looks, "great in the written regulations, but poor in execution" into
an effective money saving measure requires the following actions:
• Encourage the submission of VECPs by simplifying the VECP submission and evaluation
procedure.
• Reduce the number of personnel on the review panel and insure that review board members
have authority to approve or reject the VECP.
• Use the engineering resources in the project management team to obtain expertise quickly in
new techniques or material proposed by the VECP when the review board is lacking in these
areas.
• Insure that any VECP submission can be evaluated in 30 days to insure that a contractor has
the opportunity to implement the VECP without unduly delaying other parts of the contract.
• Sensitize project management to insure that designer pride and embarrassment are not reasons
for rejecting a VECP.
23
Construction contractors say that, in many cases, the benefits of their VECPs have been lost in the time necessary for management to review the
VECP. Contractors have frequently told management to disregard the VECP that was in the review process; "we (the construction contractor) are
no longer interested in pursuing the change." This happens when the contractor proceeds with his construction contract beyond the point where the
VECP had to be initiated; beyond this point some of the new construction must be removed before the proposed change can be started; consequently
the benefit of the proposed change is lost. One contractor indicated that he intends to avoid submission of VECPs through the remainder of his
contract because he has at least seven VECPs that have taken 6 months to a year or more to evaluate. Another construction contractor, commenting on
the number of people involved in the review, claimed that many of the personnel involved had little authority to approve or reject the proposal under
consideration. He claimed that where he has seen an effective VECP program, it has been conducted speedily and efficiently with a review and evaluation
team of not more than eight (8) persons, each of whom had the necessary authority to move the proposal along. He said, "everybody knows that you can
make progress more quickly with a committee of 5 or 6 persons rather than a committee of 20 to 30."
24
In one of the VECPs submitted, the section designer apparently had no experience in "The New Austrian Tunneling Technique;" however, both
joint venture firms participated in demonstration programs sponsored by the Department of Transportation on the Harvard Square Red Line extension
in the 1970-80's where the applicability of the tunneling technique was proven. This is a case where the Project Management could have stepped in.
and with their firms' superior knowledge of this relatively new construction technique, assumed the expert's role and quickly approved or rejected
the procedure submitted.
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From our discussions with project management and contractors, it appears that a review of\
current practices involving the VECP program is in order. Within the partnering policy of
CA/T, a group composed of members from project management, section design teams, and
construction contractors should meet quickly to resolve problems or misunderstandings
involving VECP submissions so that contractors' faith in an honest, fair and speedy review of
a proposal could be restored. Some construction contractors who vowed never to submit another
VECP might again submit timely and cost saving ideas on this project. .
C. Environmental assistance
In conforming to the legal and regulatory requirements of federal and state environmental laws, the
CA/T project has uncovered a number of areas in which assistance from the environmental regulatory
agencies could help contain and reduce construction costs without violating commitments made to
conform to applicable laws and regulations. Three of these have come to our attention through
discussions with project management and contractors:
1. Review process relief
There are a number of actions required after required permits have been received for construction
which may not be necessary to insure proper environmental protection. However, they impact the
construction schedule which is the critical concern at this time. These include notifications of minor
project changes over which there is confusion as to the applicability of MEPA regulations, reviews
required under coastal zone management regulation already included in other agency's reviews,
flexibility in the application of air quality regulations, exemption of large scale projects from
inapplicable wetlands and waterways regulations, streamlining the surface water quality permit
process, and others. 25 Use of these regulations to create often frivolous appeals can cause great
problems in maintaining the construction schedule projects, including the CA/T program, with
consequent additional costs.
2. Soil handling definitions
Construction contractors working on the CA/T program have been delayed by requirements for
handling "contaminated" soil which is excavated from construction sites, but then is "decontaminated"
if used as fill when tunneling construction is completed. They point out that their need to provide
"uncontaminated" fill for an underground site in which the leaching process of adjacent soil provides
the same level of "contaminants" as the soil extracted is not particularly efficient. Since the sites are
underground, the higher quality soils for fill are not necessary for environmental protection.
Contractors believe that more functional definitions of soil qualities and their use would help them
perform at lower cost. This appears to be an appropriate issue for study by the agencies involved.
These issues are discussed in detail in a letter and memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Executive
Office of Administration and Finance by the General Counsel of the Executive Office of Transportation and
Construction of December 11, 1996 concerning Executive Order 384.
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3. Additional landfill sites
Since the handling of excavated material from the CA/T tunneling operations has become a larger and
more difficult logistical issue than originally anticipated, project management needs the assistance
of the environmental agencies - both state and federal ~ in locating sites for additional landfill
operations. There could be significant savings available to the project if the Department of
Environmental Protection can develop procedures which encourage lower bids on the disposal of
materials to allow for the depressed Artery roadway. Possible savings are in the order of $5 to $30
million.
Soil displaced during the construction of the Artery is historic fill — material put into the harbor over
100 years ago to expand downtown Boston. While this material is not a hazardous waste, it is not
exactly pollution-free. There are a variety of sites where the material would be useful and safe,
particularly if some kind of cap is put over it. For example, it could be used under a roadway, or, as
proposed for golf courses, used to convert a flat area to one with gentle rolls and interesting contours,
capped, with grass growing above the cap. Because the material does contain some contaminants,
case-by-case review of proposed sites would be more acceptable than blanket approvals in advance.
The Artery will run out of existing disposal capacity in August, meaning that the first of the disposal
contracts must be put out to bid in June. Estimates of the cost for disposal at in-state locations is
roughly $20 per cubic yard, while out-of-state disposal may cost about fifty percent more ($30 per
cubic yard). Since approximately 4.7 million cubic yards are involved, using in-state sites could yield
savings of up to $25 to $30 million.
The chief obstacle to realizing these potential savings is in the Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) site approval process (which in the past has ranged from several months up to
several years). An accelerated review process or even pre-approval of a few existing landfills could
provide potential bidders with the assurance that there will be a quick, reliable process for approval
of additional in-state sites. The inter-agency staffing agreement between the CA/T project and DEP
may already be sufficient to cover the cost of additional DEP staff for this purpose. u
D. Other Measures
1. Police details
Police details are a significant cost to the CA/T project, a cost which is borne by the state alone. The
cost to-date is over $22 million and is expected to total nearly $75 million by the end of the project
in late 2004.
Some presence is required to direct traffic around the many construction sites of the project.
Professional police are used in Massachusetts while, in other jurisdictions, flagmen or some other less
expensive method of handling construction traffic is used.
Opposition to expedited decision making on disposal sites from the environmental community is likely. Groups who viewed the lengthy
approval process as a safeguard against possible abuse, or parties with business before DEP who feared that expedited action on Artery project
requests might further lengthen delays in dealing with their own projects might voice particular objections. Arguments against expedited action
would likely allude to fears that the state would be influenced by the potential savings and would sacrifice environmental protection in order to
save money on the CA/T project.
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Project management has negotiated an arrangement with the City of Boston and its police unions
which requires a sergeant with every two patrolmen—the sergeant stands a post for each CA/T site
with the detail work centralized under a captain. This is a compromise from the usual system that
would have had a sergeant for each three patrolmen, and every two sergeants requiring a captain. The
latter would have cost over $120 million. The compromise first meant a cost estimate of about $80
million. The estimate has been further reduced to about $75 million through a better understanding
of construction staging.
Management argues that an urban environment requires a professional police presence at a
construction site. Moreover, they argue, flagmen cannot act in a remedial or preventative traffic
situation. Thus, they conclude that the "myth that flagmen are cheeper (sic)" is not always true, that,
with union wage structures and overhead, their cost "approaches" those of the professional detail.
Others would argue that flagmen costs may approach those of a professional detail, but they are still
far away. The federal government used to participate fully in sharing, but gradually reduced its share
of these costs. After some controversy, there was voluntary agreement that the state would be
responsible for full costs. '
2. Insurance Program
The CA/T's risk management or insurance program is one of the success stories of the project thus far.
Built on a successful and effective safety program, luck, and good owner-contractor relationships the
insurance program is expected to realize substantial credits by project's end.
The Massachusetts Highway Department (MHD) undertook a risk assessment in 1991 to determine
how to manage and insure the project's risks until completion. Its decision was to undertake an owner-
owned or wrap-up insurance program in 1992 that they believe would be easier to manage, more
productive and more cost effective than insurance purchased by each contractor and sub-contractor.
The insurance program includes six different coverages; the largest and most expensive are Workmen's
Compensation (WC) and General Liability (GL). The former covers workers and the latter third
parties. The two programs account for about 90% of the premiums paid withWC responsible for about
two-thirds of premiums.
Total premium payments from 1992 to the end of the project are expected to total about $780 million;
close to $300 million has been paid to date. The actual or net cost of the program by project's end
should be about $150 million, however, provided current projected loss ratios and other assumptions
are realized.
Current loss ratios, a function of losses and premium payments, are far below the expected loss ratio
of 55% and the 75% upon which the initial policy was based. Current WC loss ratio is 30% and the
GLloss ratio is 12%.
The state makes regular premium payments into a trust fund designed to cover anticipated losses. The
trust fund has two loss accounts that are used to pay claims filed during construction. Annual interest
earned on these accounts is shared equally between MHD and the insurance carrier. A third account,
recently established, is MHD's retained earnings account into which is transferred MHD's share of
annual interest generated by the two loss accounts.
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The retained earnings account is expected to total about $350 million by 2005. Retention of that
amount and its successful investment until 2018 when the claims period should end is projected to
generate about $600 million.
It should be pointed out, however, that the current loss experience has taken place in a period when
only about 30% of construction has been completed. Remaining is the complex and difficult
downtown construction with its higher risks. Higher loss ratios would lower the program savings
from the expected $600 million. For the project to realize its optimistic scenario, it will have to ratchet
up the intensity of the safety program and continue to enjoy the same degree of luck.
3. Approval of plans for vertical construction
Chapter 1 1 of the Acts of 1997, adds CA/T vertical construction to the definition of capital facilities
which are exempted from the Division of Capital Planning and Operation (DCPO) jurisdiction.
DCPO has the statutory authority to review and approve or disapprove the plans and specifications for
all public building construction by the state. The items included in each section of the Plans and
Specifications are such that the buildings which contain them are generally termed "Vertical
Construction," or buildings generally intended to be occupied. This contrasts with construction
authorized under Chapter 30 of the General Laws termed "Horizontal Construction" or more
commonly, highway or heavy construction.
The CA/T Project contains a number of facilities which can be classified as vertical construction and
which normally would come under the jurisdiction of the DCPO. These are:
-The ventilation buildings
-The parking garage (at Parcel 7) which has retail space at grade and some office space.
-The operation and control center
--The back-up to the operation and control center
—The toll plaza
-Emergency Stations (4 each) where tow trucks are in readiness
-The central maintenance facility in South Boston
-The satellite maintenance facility
-One or two electrical sub-stations
~A visitors' center on Spectacle Island
The DCPO has the statutory authority to control and supervise the planning, design and construction
of public buildings, except for projects which the Legislature has exempted from DCPO jurisdiction.
The DCPO and the Department of Public Works (DPW), now the Massachusetts Highway Department
(MHD), developed an agreement in August 1990 in which the two agencies agreed to certain inter-
agency procedures certificating of planning (within 21 days), approving of the MHD procurement
procedure for the selection of a final designer, management of the final design (within 2 1 days) and
resolution of disagreements (within 10 to 15 days). The plans and specifications cannot be advertised
until they are approved.
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In 1994, Section 1 1 of Chapter 102 of the Acts of 1994 (the Transportation Bond Bill), specified MHD
jurisdiction over design ot the CA/T project ventilation of buildings, utility facilities and toll booths
subject to prior review by the Inspector General.
The 1996 transportation bond bill expanded the IG's responsibility to include review of construction
as well. The Inspector General has since conducted reviews of a number of facilities (See IG
publication: "Statutorily Mandated Reviews of Central Artery/Tunnel Projects Building Construction
Contracts" dated December 1996), and concentrated on:
--Cost Containment
-Cost and Design Changes
-Change Orders/Value Engineering
-Mitigation Agreements
-Federal Funding
In effect, DCPO has no role in CA/T construction while the Inspector General (IG) does.
It would appear that the IG's staff may have neither the number nor the variety of engineering
personnel needed to review and approve plans and specifications for the CA/T project. The Inspector
General's responsibility and expertise is in the area of detecting and preventing fraud, waste and abuse
while the DCPO's is in planning, engineering, design and construction. Thus, it appears that the
Inspector General's office has been assigned a responsibility in an area where it may not be qualified
to perform.
CA/T management should evaluate the impact of this transferred authority to ensure that the
Inspector General's new authority does not additionally delay the review and approval of plans
and specifications and therefore slow down the completion of the CA/T project.
SUMMARY OF COST CONTAINMENT/REDUCTION ISSUES IN THE CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS
As we have discussed, there are a variety of measures which are being and could be applied to
help in containing and reducing CA/T costs during the intense period of construction now
underway. These are summarized in Table 3.4. While many of the most important measures
are the responsibility of CA/T management, others will require the active support and
cooperation of the Legislature and other state and local agencies. With each area of potential
cost reduction having a "constituency" whose interest may be affected by any change in existing
practice, there is no guarantee that implementing any or all these measures will be easy.
Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the Commonwealth and its taxpayers to see that as many of
these measures as possible can be tried, tested, and implemented as the program moves ahead.
Without a cooperative effort on the part of all the "parties at interest," including a more active
role on the part of the Legislature to monitor and assist in the process, the potential for increased
project costs will be high.
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Table 3.4 - SUMMARY OF CA/T CONSTRUCTION COST ISSUES
SUBJECT
BID POLICY
FINDINGS POTENTIAL COST
SAVINGS
RECOMMENDATION
Bidders list expansion
Bid acceptance
Concerns with the small
number of bidders on
large contracts and the
procedures for
accepting bids varying
from office estimates
Not easy to determine,
bat could be a problem
with new bids higher
than office estimates
Monitoring of bidding
process is required to
determine if action is
needed
A-B bid procedure
Filed sub-bid exemption
CONTRACT ADM'N
Partnering Policy
Change Order Policy
VECP Policy
Legislation needed to
take advantage of
possible cost savings
These should be the
most effective way to
control or reduce costs
as the large
construction contracts
are let
Limited but possibly
important
Could range from 3%
to 4% of remaining
contract values with
effective handling of
these techniques
Proposed legislation is
justified and allows CA/T to
experiment with these
approaches
Streamline review and
approval system-
Experiment with
"deductible" for change
orders ~ Encourage
submission of VECPs
ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSISTANCE
Review relief
Soil definitions
Additional landfill sites
Construction process is
uncovering problems
which cause additional
cost
Savings in soil
handling policy could
make a substantial
difference in costs to
complete
Cooperation from DEP and
other relevant agencies
should be encouraged
OTHER MEASURES
Police details These costs have been
disallowed by the
FHWA for Federal
funds participation, so
that the State has to
pick up these costs
Millions now spent on
this function, which
has strong support
from the Police unions,
could be reduced
.
Legislation is required to
change police details policy
— reexamination of
Legislature's position
suggested.
Insurance Program Wrap-around program
has played an
important role in
keeping CA/T budget
on target
Very large potential
budget saving are
evident with low
accident experience
Monitoring of insurance
claim experience suggested
to determine future action.
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CHAPTER 4 - COST CONTAINMENT/REDUCTION IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT
The cost of managing the design and construction of the Central Artery /Tunnel project has been a
prominent part of the overall budget. About $ 2.6 billion, or over 25% of the budget, has been allocated
to these functions.
27 Because of the tremendous size and scope of the project, it was decided early on
that the design and construction process could not be handled by the MHD, the agency normally
responsible for managing highway building projects in the Commonwealth. As a result, the assistance
of an outside construction management firm was sought through the competitive bidding process. In
1985, the Joint Venture of the Bechtel Corporation, one of the world's largest and most reputable
construction management firms, and Parsons Brinkerhoff Quade and Douglas, a large engineering firm
with extensive experience in tunneling projects in urban areas, was selected and has been responsible for
project management ever since.
From 1988 through mid 1996 (which was the intense period ofengineering of the project), the total cost
of the design and management services averaged over $20 million a month, or 43% of the total project
costs incurred during this period. This expenditure, while large, bought the project the hundreds of
required approvals from environmental and funding agencies, the agreements on how the project was
to be built and mitigation measures to be included in the design and construction bid packages. While
some observers feel this amount of design and management expenditure was excessive, others viewed
it as necessary to resolve all the complicated engineering and community related mitigation issues the
project engendered.
Table 4.1 - PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND DESIGN COSTS THROUGH MID 1996
PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROJECT FINAL DESIGN COMBINED DESIGN AND
(includes preliminary design) MANAGEMENT
$1,300 M- 1988 to 1996 $ 800 M - 1989 to 1996 S 2,100 M - 1988 to 1996
$ 12.04 M/month for 108 mo. $ 8.33 M/month for 96 mo. S 20.36 M/month for 96 mo.
Source: MHD financial plan of 9/96 and summary project master schedule
The MHD financial plan of September 1996 estimated that $506 million would be required in the
management budget for the period June 1996 to January 2000, and $179 million for final design
activities (principally for surface restoration of the Artery and connections once the tunnel construction
is complete). This final design work is scheduled to be completed before the end of 1997. The
management costs will be used mainly to supervise construction contractors as they move through the
27
This figure includes SI.632 billion for the Joint Venture which covers both the preliminary engineering design work and
management of both the design and construction process along with $1,028 billion for final section designs carried out by
other engineering contractors under the supervision of the Joint Venture. This is a significant allocation of total project
resources. Other mega projects, admittedly less complicated than the "Big Dig", have been able to be completed with a much
smaller allocation for engineering design and project management. For example, of the total cost of close to S3.0 billion
required to construct the Denver International Airport, roughly only $300 million, or about 10% of the total was needed to
purchase the services of outside project management and design firms. However, it is important to point out that Denver
created an integrated project management team which included a number of the City's own employees working side by side
with the outside contractors.
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building process The CA/T management report of January, 1997, however, indicates an estimated
management budget requirement of $ 638 million for the period up to the year 200028 . The $638
million includes an amount of $210 million needed beyond 1999. ( Appendix A, P. 17)
As the project moves into its final construction stages, it will be important for those responsible for its
supervision to explore the possibilities for functions now planned for the management consultant to
be absorbed by the agencies which will have ultimate responsibility for operating the system,
particularly the MHD and the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. With the passage of the
Metropolitan Highway System legislation, the Turnpike Authority will be thrust into a new and
expanded role in the transportation picture of the region, a role that will require a major
transformation of the agency into a first class system provider with expanded scope and quality
of operations. In this context, the expanded role of the Authority and the MHD should provide the
opportunity to transfer some of the CA/T management functions to these agencies as appropriate.
We have made a preliminary assessment of this potential for cost savings by reviewing the costs,
staffing structure and functions contained in the current work plan (Work Order 14) as well as the
Project Management Plan of 12/31/96. The results of this review are presented for possible
exploration by project management and the appropriate agencies, not as definitive
recommendations at this stage.
The contract for management services, which includes both the Joint Venture and their subcontractors,
has three elements of cost: direct costs, which are essentially the salaries of the employees working
on the project; indirect or overhead costs; and a management fee, which in the case of the CA/T
contract is 1 1% of the total of all direct and indirect costs. In the current work plan, the services of the
Joint Venture firms account for about 85% of the budgeted costs and subcontractors 15%. This work
plan covers about 900 staff positions covered by the management contract. In general, there are two
categories of possible savings; the first is eliminating a function or position; the second is transferring
a function or position out of the management consultant's
budget to that of one of the state agencies, thereby reducing part of the overhead costs associated with
the management contract. 29
The overhead rate for the staff of the Joint Venture is in the neighborhood of 1 10%. If a position for
an employee with an annual salary of $60,000 is eliminated, the savings potential is over $145,000 per
year ($60,000 in direct costs plus close to $66,000 in indirect costs and a fee of $14,000). If the
position is transferred to a state agency, the savings might be in the order of $ 60,000 to $80,000 per
year depending on the amount of non-salary expense associated with the agency position. The annual
cost savings for a position with a salary of $75,000 are in the neighborhood of $ 175,000 if the position
is eliminated entirely or up to $80,000 to $100,000 if the position is transferred. With a work force
of about 900 people currently on the payroll of the Joint Venture, a reduction or transfer of from 5%
An additional $244 million for management costs has been identified as needed for the period from 2000 to 2002
(the original end of the project). This amounts to a teal of over $800 million to close out the construction program.
While it can be argued that there are overhead costs associated with state agencies, they are usually not at die
same level as those associated with a private contractor.
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to 10%, or just 45 to 90 positions, could engender important savings. The CA/T project management
team is currently working in this direction.
There are three areas of potential cost savings which should be explored by CA/T management:
1. Duplication of functions — a situation where one part of the management consultant staff is
carrying out functions also being handled by another part or by MHD or another state agency.
2. Community relations activities - particularly those related to the ongoing functions of the MHD
and the Turnpike Authority which will be responsible for operating the Metropolitan Highway System
when completed.
3. Non-essential functions — particularly those which may not be required for project completion in
a cost containment environment.
1. Duplication of functions
There appears to be some potential duplication of functions among various sections of the management
consultant's team, as described in the current work plan, 30 and MHD and other state agencies. Some
of these may be essential and justified, but others might be reviewed to determine whether some
overlap can be eliminated.
• Right of way activities - The MHD has a full time, experienced Right ofWay Bureau. Given
the relatively small amount of right of way activity left in the CA/T program, could this activity
be turned over to MHD? These activities include preparing preliminary plans, preparing
easements, spot takings, land management, and legislative support (See Work Order 14, page
5).
• Geotechnical support —This is provided for in the current work plan as a support to design
and construction activities, but does this overlap with the activities of area design and geotech
consultants? (See Work Order 14, page 5)
• Coordinating with Federal, State, and local agencies -- The work plan describes this as a
function of the management consultant in coordinating the activities of 30 different agencies.
Is there some level of this coordination that might be handled as well or better by the staff of
EOTC or some other permanent agency? (See Work Order 14, page 7)
30
See Work Order 14 - page references as follow.
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Fiscal Management -- There is provision for a fiscal management function within the
management consultant team. Since the development of funding strategies and coordination of
contract status are also carried on by EOTC and other branches of the state government, is this
function still required in the program of the management consultant? ( See Work Order 14, page
15)
Staff support functions -- In the functions of the management consultant, there are some
categories of support which might represent duplication. For example, there are positions for
a director of communications and a director of media relations. Both of these functions are
included in the staffing of other state agencies, including the Turnpike Authority, MHD, and
EOTC. Is it possible to combine and/or reassign some of these activities to the permanent
agencies, particularly since they are on-going functions of these agencies ? Does the
management consultant need to have a legal librarian when MHD has a legal staff? (See Work
Order 14, page 21)
Communication and contract administration - There is a function in the current work plan
for servicing the Freedom of Information Act and audit information requests. There is also a
function for a communications/ records management responsible for documentation. Would it
be possible to combine the units responsible for these functions to save staff expense? There
is a subcontracting unit in the Procurement function and a contract administration unit, both
charged with relations with Joint Venture subcontractors. Could these functions be combined?
There is a Prime Contract Administrator as a stand-alone position whose only function appears
to be administering the contract between MHD and the Joint Venture. Is this a function that
needs a separate position in light of the contract administration functions in the procurement
and contract administration units? (See Project Management Plan, pages 31-33)
Construction management — There is a construction support department responsible for
processing VECP proposals. The same role is performed in part by the resident engineers and
the area construction managers. Is there some overlap in these functions the elimination of
which could reduce staff costs? There is a technical support manager responsible for
forecasting, training, etc, .and a projects control group with responsibility for estimating,
scheduling and training. Are there some savings possible in this area? ( See Project Management
Plan, page 36)
2. Community relations activities
While recognizing that community and external relations are extremely important to ensuring the
successful completion of the project, there will be a time when these activities should be transferred
from the CA/T management to the permanent agencies and consolidated with their ongoing functions.
Among the most important of these now handled under the management contract are:
• Community outreach — The human resources function includes outreach activities for
affirmative action and community based organizations, along with the clearinghouse for
these organizations. (Work order 14, page 13)
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• Community relations - The public affairs function covers extensive community relations
and external affairs activities (Work order 14, page 19).
• Community participation ~ The architectural design services function, now primarily
involved in the planning for the reuse of land in downtown Boston with the removal of the
elevated Central Artery structure, is a function of the management contract (Work order 14,
page 5).
• Small business assistance ~ This service, which includes technical assistance and
marketing, is also covered under the management contract (See Project Management Plan,
page 9).
In order to contain and reduce CA/T management costs in these areas, it should be possible for EOTC,
MHD, and the Turnpike Authority to work out a scheme for absorbing some of these functions into
their existing public affairs, community relations and human resources operations in a way that would
help relieve the budget burden without affecting the overall performance of the CA/T construction
program.
3. Non-essential functions
As cutting the cost of program management becomes a priority as a cost containment/reduction
measure, there are other areas currently contained within the scope of the management contract which
might be examined for their priority in the management budget. These include:
• Temporary agency administration — The recruitment of temporary staff used by the project
is now handled by an outside contractor. With a downsized management operation, is it possible
to handle this function internally? (See Work Order 14, page 13)
• Senior management functions — The activities of the Board of Control of the Joint Venture
are covered in the management budget. The positions of executive assistant and administrative
assistant to the Program Manager are also covered. In a cost containment environment, are there
some cost reduction potentials in these areas? (See Work Order 14, page 19, and Project Management
Plan, figure 5.2)
Use of large task forces — We have noted the observations of a number of the participants in
the CA/T program of the use of relatively large task forces by project management to address
critical issues, solve problems and develop policy. While the use of task forces is essential to
good project management to provide broad perspectives on problem solving, for team building,
and for quick resolution of issues, the amount of time required by key staff to participate in large
meetings could detract from the performance of their primary functions. Without reducing the
substantial benefits gained from the use of task forces, could their size and number be contained
to prevent the poor use of key managers' time?
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CHAPTER 5 - FINANCING CA/T
While the political, environmental, and transportation management contexts have remained
relatively unchanged since the construction program of the CA/T program began in 1991, the
financing context for the project has changed significantly.
During the time that the project was being conceived, the Interstate Highway program was in effect and
was assumed to provide the basis for the funding. This program provided federal government
reimbursement for 90% of the costs ofconstruction for the parts of the projects on the Interstate system.
While most other states were able to complete their elements of the program before its expiration, the
length of time it took to plan and construct both the 1-90 and 1-93 segments of the CA/T project meant
that Massachusetts could not complete the construction before the termination date. The Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), which provided for the continuation of the use
of highway trust funds to finance the completion of interstate highways, was to end completely by the
mid 1990's. 31 ISTEA funding will expire at the end of the current federal fiscal year, September 30,
1997. Replacement legislation now being shaped in Congress, amid increased competition for limited
transportation funding from states in the south and mid-west, is unlikely to have as favorable a net
impact toward the Commonwealth. These changes in the federal funding climate are occurringjust
as the project is about to undergo its heaviest construction period and cash flow requirements
are about to peak.
The likely result of the federal highway funding formula adjustment is that the state may have
to pay a much larger proportion - possibly as much as 30% or 40% — of the cost for the
Artery/Tunnel than the 10% share anticipated when the project was initially funded.
1. Federal funds
The major unknown variable in the current funding plan - one that is crucial to its share of the future
costs of the CA/T project — is what the state can expect from the new federal highway legislation.
For FFY 97, the last year ofISTEA, the state expects to receive about $650 million. It has posited high,
middle or low federal funds scenarios for subsequent years ranging from over $800 million a year to
$450 million from a new federal law.
The battle over the new federal formula is being waged between the donor states, those paying more in
federal highway taxes annually than they receive back in highway aid, ( i.e., Florida, Texas and
3 1 While providing for increased Interstate Construction funding to reflect the costs of inflation in the 1 980s, ISTEA legislation recognized that,
except for the CA/T project, the Century Freeway project in Los Angeles, and a few others, the Interstate System was complete. The legislation
provided that the states would receive instead what was in effect a block grant, based on a complex formula which would guarantee that states would
not suffer a steep decline in their annual highway trust fund allocations while the legislation was in force through 1997. Because of this provision.
Massachusetts officials were not overly concerned with the ISTEA provisions in the early 1990's. However, as the Appropriations Committee of
the U.S. House of Representatives stated in its report to the full House on the U.S. Department of Transportation fiscal year 1997 appropriations bill,
the Interstate Construction funds provided to the project in fiscal 1995. "are intended to be the final contributions for construction under the Interstate
program. Accordingly, Massachusetts must accept the risks associated with potential cost overruns and possible reductions in future federal-aid
apportionment levels."
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other southern and mid-western states) and the donee states, (i.e., Massachusetts, New York and other
northeast states). The battle is not expected to be resolved before the end of 1997 at the earliest.
Massachusetts has done very well under the current ISTEA, averaging $830 million a year in
apportionment or 4.5% of the total annual apportionment of about $ 18 billion. What everyone receives,
however, is based on how much the Congress appropriates, which usually is limited to close to 90%
of the apportionment amount.
There are several bills now in the Congress, each with significant support. Step 21, a bill sponsored
by Senator Warner of Virginia and supported by 23 others, could have the most severe impact on
Massachusetts' federal highway allotment. It would produce an annual apportionment of $430 million,
about 1.7% of the $ 22.5 to $25.5 billion national highway funding total. Step 21 would produce a
double whammy effect, giving Massachusetts a smaller proportion of a bigger pie. Another bill,
sponsored by Senator Baucus of Montana and 16 others, called Stars 2000, would be similarly as
damaging to Massachusetts as Step 21.
The President's bill and a bill offered by Senator Moynihan of New York and 33 co-sponsors
(1STEAII) offer the most for Massachusetts. The former would provide an annual apportionment of
$580 million, or 2.9% of a $20 billion total, while Moynihan's would provide a $656 million annual
apportionment or 2.7% of a total apportionment of $24.3 billion. Again, it is pointed out that actual
funds or obligations that would be available probably would be closer to 90% of the above figures.
The recently passed balanced budget agreement only allows about $22.5 billion a year. (This could
reduce the state's apportionments particularly under Step 21 and ISTEAII). Should an even worse case
outcome than Step 21 result, the state would be forced to dig deeply into its tool bag of solutions,
among which could be increased funds from Mass Pike and possible shifting of highway funds from
non-CA/T projects, a concern of communities distant from the project.
2. The 1997 State Transportation authorization
The state administration sought approval of a multi- billion dollar transportation bond bill to
cover the funding needs of the Central Artery Project, other federally-assisted statewide
improvements in the State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP), and non-federally-assisted
statewide transportation projects statewide at least through the 1999 federal fiscal year (FFY 99) or
September 30, 1999. The Legislature enacted the bill in to law in May 1997.
Enactment of the legislation essentially:
• Allows CA/T construction to move rapidly and on a timely basis.
• Helps keep the project on schedule to closure.
• Allows the State to capture construction cost savings of up to $250 from the relatively low current
inflation rate.
• Responds to the FHWA's ultimatum to disapprove future advance construction.
• Makes it easier to cope with the expected cash flow or obligations deficit of 1998-2001.
• Provides some comfort to the credit agencies.
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• Sends a positive message to the Congress in its development of a new federal highway formula.
3. The breakdown
The new law authorizes $3.0 billion for the CA/T project, of which $1.7 billion would be federal share
and $1.3 billion would be state share. Included in the state's share is an increased contribution to the
project from Mass Pike of $700 million. Some $100 million of the state's share is for CA/T project
costs that are not reimbursable.
The federal share of $ 1.7 billion includes $900 million which the state will issue in the form ofGANS
or short-term grant anticipation notes.
While the amount of the bond bill authorization is only expected to service needs through FFY
99, this is the schedule period that is most sensitive, with major construction under way and
major construction awards to be made.
4. Construction awards
Chapter 1 1 of the Acts of 1997 responds to the need to fund the host of CA/T construction contracts
in 1997 and 1998. According to the 1996 Finance Plan, construction costs made up $4.8 billion or
87% of the project's overall to-go costs in 1996.
Some $908 million in construction awards were made in 1996. By the end of 1997, almost another
billion dollars in awards is expected to have been made; another $750 million is to be awarded in 1998.
Altogether, between $3.0 and $3.5 billion in construction will be under way from awards made in the
latter two years.
Timely construction awards will keep the overall schedule moving (the major element in keeping the
$10.4+ billion current project cost estimate from erupting). Failure to provide timely funds could
cause delay in contract awards which could bring about a ripple effect which would extend the project
schedule with its potential for increasing overall costs.
Award of the contracts at this time enables the state to capture the benefits of the currently low
inflation rate of 2.75%. The $10.4 cost estimate is built on an inflation rate of 3.35%. This 60 basis
point difference, together with the project's ability to go full bore on construction, represents up to
$250 million in essentially lower construction costs which at best would hold down the overall project
cost and at worst offset unexpected cost increases.
Although there are likely to be future funding needs subsequent to FFY '99, the light at the end of the
tunnel should be shining at that time.
The law also helps the state to deal with the obligations flow deficit of over $1.0 billion dollars
between 1998 and 2001. Between these years, costs are expected to exceed anticipated revenue from
the federal government while after 2001 those revenues are expected to exceed costs. Short-term
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borrowing is authorized in anticipation of the post FFY 99 federal funding and would bridge the deficit
gap with the law also providing state back-up for the short-term notes.
The law could serve as a comfort to the credit agencies who dislike the intermittent project
borrowing with its uncertainty.
Finally, the law responded to the ultimatum of the FHWA which had notified the state that no advance
construction approvals would be made after April 1, 1997 unless third party agreements were finalized
and legislative options identified in the financial feasibility report of November 1996 were pursued.
Advance construction establishes future eligibility for federal funds, if and when they become
available. Because there is no obligation of federal funds at the time of advance construction approval
by the FHWA, the state has to have funding commitments for the full cost of each contract. As a
prerequisite to FHWA's concurrence to advance construction contracts, the state had to demonstrate
that it had sufficient cash, binding contracts with third parties, (i.e. Mass Port and Mass Pike), and/or
unencumbered legislative authority to cover total contract costs, exclusive of the amount of federal
funds actually obligated.
5. Effect on state debt
The state currently has three constraints on the size of its debt load — two are statutory, one is
administrative.
The first statutory constraint relates outstanding direct debt or general obligation debt to a
predetermined figure. The direct debt limit amount was established in 1990 at $6.8 billion to be
increased 5% a year. Thus, in fiscal 1996, the direct debt limit was $8.7 billion. Outstanding direct
debt at the close of FY 1996 was $8. 1 billion. This restraint is not considered significant at this time
because of the moving target.
The second statutory restraint limits annual debt service to no more than 10% of total budgeted
expenditures. For FY 96, it was 5.4% and is projected to be 5.7% for FY 97. Thus, it also is not a
meaningful restraint at this time.
The more meaningful restraint is the administrative policy that tries to limit the annual issuance of debt
to no more than $900 million. This has the effect of maintaining the annual debt load and debt
service relatively level since it tries to relate new bond issuance to bond retirement
6. The state's credit
While some believe such a large authorization might affect the state's credit rating, thereby increasing
its cost of bond issuance, others would argue that timing of the actual issuance is the more important
element of the credit equation, and certainly of the impact on the state's overall finances.
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The rating agencies are well aware of the state's current debt load and large future authorizations,
yet continue to rate the state highly.
In rating the state's last general obligation issue in September 1996, Fitch and Standard and Poor's
rated it A+ and called the state's outlook "positive" even while recognizing that considerable
transportation funding would be needed; Moody's rating was Al.
Fitch said, "While the economy has firmed and fiscal soundness has been restored, debt is still high
and likely to remain so as considerable transportation needs remain to be funded."
Moody's, in its fall 1996 report, said, "The Commonwealth's above average credit rating standing
acknowledges its restoration and maintenance of fiscal control in the years since 1991 and an
economy which generates high personal income and continues to expand. These credit strengths
are tempered by a heavy debt load, uncertainties regarding future debt requirements..."
Standard and Poor's in September 1996 also called the state's long-term outlook positive. It said,
"significant capital needs will be addressed through debt issuance, which is expected to keep debt
levels high. Potential additional costs for the Third Harbor Tunnel/Central Artery project, as well
as new funding for prisons and schools, could create additional expenditure and debt pressures. The
Commonwealth may need to make difficult choices between capital needs if it wishes to maintain
the already high overall debt burden at current levels and to remain within its self-imposed target
of maintaining future annual debt issuance at $900 million."
The capital needs choices in 1997 may not be as difficult, however, since the only other bond
authorization, besides the transportation bond authorization this year, is the $685 million for court
house construction and reconstruction. However, choices in 1998 and thereafter would be difficult.
The credit agencies dislike uncertainty and surprises, and would be more comfortable with the State
putting its project funding needs up front.
The plan behind the state bond authorization is sound and should keep the project moving on
schedule. Care must be taken to manage the issue to insure minimal impact on the state's
bond rating. The bond issue also permits construction to move ahead full speed, thus creating
the opportunity to realize up to $250 million in lower construction costs by locking in current
low interest rates.
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7. Grant Anticipation Notes -- GANS
Chapter 1 1 authorized the state to issue nearly $1.2 billion in grant anticipation notes (GANS) during
the 1^8-2001 period when CA/T project costs are expected to exceed available funds.
Short term anticipator)' borrowing is a financing technique that is widely-used by governments. For
example, this technique is used in anticipation of long-term borrowing when the bond market is weak
or when there Is insufficient need at the time for the bond funds (BANS). It is also used when immediate
cash needs exceed current tax or other revenue collections (TANS and RANS).
For the CA/T project, 1998-2001 is the peak construction period, during which costs will greatly exceed
the more level flow of available funds. This situation will result in a cash or obligations flow deficit.
Between 2001 and 2005, the opposite situation should prevail with available funds exceeding costs and
producing a cash flow surplus. Thus, GANS would be used during the cash flow deficit period to be
repaid from the funds of the cash surplus period.
The problem is how to structure the notes to be repaid by federal funds in a way that will make them
most marketable. State officials have met with several investment banking firms on how to best structure
them, especially on how to enhance the security of the notes beyond the future federal grants.
Chapter 1 1 authorizes the use of the state's full faith and credit to support $900 million in GANS. The
remaining $300 million might be secured solely by the federal funds without any credit enhancement.
However, these would be harder to market and probably more costly to the state. There are various
other ways to enhance the security of the notes, however; these alternatives are under discussion and
may be used.
The use of GANS in the amount sought by Massachusetts has not been done before, but New Jersey
recently issued GANS of about $500 - $600 million.
8. Metropolitan Highway System legislation
The new Metropolitan Highway System law creates a highway system within the Route 128 perimeter
which will be owned and managed by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), including the major
elements of the CA/T program. It includes a number of important implications for the Central
Artery/Tunnel project:
First, it provides a mechanism for generating additional toll revenues on an expanded set of highway
facilities which will include the new Ted Williams Tunnel, the existing Sumner and Callahan Tunnels,
and the Masspike extension. These revenues will be needed to help finance the construction, operation
and maintenance of CA/T components and to help with the short term cash flow deficit. The law
provides flexibility to the MTA in establishing a toll increase policy, a factor the bond rating agencies
consider critical when it comes to supporting MTA bonds. While the revenue potential applies only
to existing toll facilities at present, there may be future opportunities to expand the tolling or "charge
for use" concept to other components of the system, with appropriate changes in legislation at the state
and federal level. This could be a way to provide a more equitable distribution of the burden of toll
revenue generation among all the geographic segments of the metropolitan region. At present, tolls
are charged on facilities heavily used by North Shore and metro west communities, while communities
in the North and South that are served by 1-93 pay no tolls.
Second, it puts the MTA in a new and important position in the CA/T construction process now in full
swing. As eventual "owner" of CA/T facilities, MTA is in a position to absorb some of the role of the
program manager in the remaining stages of the construction process, if it can expand its staff
capability. The current program manager, the B/PB joint venture, is budgeted just until the end of
2000. The remaining six years to complete all the CA/T work will require management supervision,
which ideally could be handled by switching some B/PB and MHD personnel to the MTA payroll. If
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this happened before 2000, some portion of the funds currently allocated to the Joint Venture might
be cut back.
Third, MTA expands its long term role in highway transportation not only by being the generator of
major toll revenues, but also by becoming actual "manager" of traffic flows and capacity on what will
be the key links in the metropolitan highway system. New traffic management technology will become
an important feature of the future. In addition, MTA will have the opportunity to play a major role in
the economic development of the region through the development of air rights over its highway
facilities. All this requires that MTA become a more important and responsive professional agency,
shedding its image as a third rate patronage-filled organization on the margins of transportation policy.
It will need to fit more closely into the political fabric of metropolitan Boston and the state than in the
past, without jeopardizing its independence.
MTA's toll generating ability will be tested by its need, under the 1997 bond legislation, to come up
with $700 million as its share of project costs; by a poor federal funding scenario that could occur; and
by its need to provide annual operating funds when the MHS system is complete.
The plan for MTA to become the owner of major CA/T facilities is sound, and it is needed as a
toll revenue generating mechanism. If MTA can become a solid professional transportation
agency, the ability of the state to reduce project management and operational costs should be
enhanced significantly.
Table S.l -CA/T FUNDING/FINANCIAL ISSUES
SUBJECT
STATE BOND
AUTHORIZATION
FINDINGS
Care must be taken to manage
the issue properly to insure
minimal impact on the Slate's
bond rating.
COST SAVING POTENTIAL
Up to $250 million in lower
construction costs could be
realized from its host of
construction contracts that can
be awarded.
METROPOLITAN
HIGHWAY SYSTEM
LEGISLATION
ISTEAAND
FEDERAL FUNDING
USE OF GRANT
ANTICD?ATION
NOTES (CANS)
The plan for MTA to become
the owner of major CA/T
facilities is sound. Its toll
generating ability will be
tested
The use of GANS to insure the
bridging of the cash flow
deficit period is appropriate.
If MTA can become a solid
professional transportation
agency quickly, the ability of
CA/T to reduce management
costs should be enhanced.
If Federal funding can be
increased over the conservative
assumptions in the state finance
plan, it will help in keeping
borrowing costs low.
GANS are less costly and more
marketable with the support of
the state's full faith and credit.
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CHAPTER 6-THE BENEFITS AND BENEFICIARIES
While the attention of the public has been and will be focused in the near future on the construction
of the Central Artery and the Third Harbor Tunnel, there has been little recent public attention paid
to the implications of the system, once completed. However, it is timely to consider a number of
issues the policy makers will have to face when the system is in operation, the benefits are in place,
and the costs of its operation, including retiring the sizable debt generated by the construction, are
evident.
When all the construction is completed, there are three main categories of public benefits32 that will
result:
1. An improved flow of traffic in the center of the metropolitan region.
2. New environmental amenities.
3. New economic development opportunities.
1. Improved traffic flow
First and foremost, virtually all the heavy volume of through traffic now moving into, out of and
through downtown Boston and the adjacent waterfront areas in South Boston on or above the surface
will be moving underground — out of sight and out of mind. The elevated Central Artery as we know
it today will disappear and downtown Boston, one of the region's (and arguably one of the nation's)
vital and vibrant economic assets, will have a much better environment in which to function, grow
and expand with less traffic-related pollution than today. Traffic noise will be reduced and air quality
may improve somewhat. Also the ability to control traffic flow and improve the safety of the
highways in regional centers will be greatly enhanced.
Second, and equally important, people — business travelers, residents, students, tourists, visitors to
the region and employees ~ moving to and from Logan Airport will have much better and quicker
access, particularly those located to the West and South of downtown who currently access the
airport by adding to the congestion and pollution of downtown as they line up to use the Callahan
Tunnel. The connection of the new Ted Williams Tunnel to the Masspike, the Southeast Expressway
and the new Central Artery Tunnel will make this travel much more convenient than it is today. Since
the airport is one of the most important facilities supporting the entire economy of the metropolitan
region and Eastern New England, improved access will be a major benefit. About 88% of Logan
32
Other Benefits -- There are a number of other economic benefits which the CA/T project has produced, two of
which are most apparent. First, local companies involved in the construction and engineering industry will have an
unmatched period of contract work which will boost their ability to improve the financial performance and
increase their power nationally and internationally. This is so because of the new design and construction
techniques used on the CA/T project that will be sought after in subsequent urban highway construction projects.
Second, the jobs created in the design and construction of the CA/T program will have made significant
contributions to the metropolitan economy over almost two decades of operation.
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travelers begin or end their trip in Boston, requiring a trip to or from the airport.33
2. New environmental amenities
There will be a number of new public facilities that will enhance the environment of the region,
including new parks, open spaces in downtown and along the Charles River in Cambridge, and a park
on Spectacle Island in Boston Harbor made possible by using soil excavated for the tunnels to cap
the existing landfill on the island.
Modernized sewers built in connection with the CA/T project, along with capping the Spectacle
Island landfill, will contribute significantly to efforts to clean up Boston Harbor -- a long term priority
of the region for environmental improvement.
The utilities relocation program allows the major water, sewer, and telephone service providers in the
downtown area to install new and modernized facilities, including a fiber optics system.
3. New economic development opportunities
In addition to the 27 acres of land which will be made available for improvements in the quality of
the environment in downtown Boston when the artery structure is removed, a new piece ofimportant
land area, previously only marginally accessible, will be opened up for high quality future economic
development. The seafront area on the northern fringe of South Boston, still mostly parking lots and
old, often obsolete industrial buildings, will be opened up for new development as a result of the new
interchange on the Ted Williams Tunnel - Masspike connector as well as the new transit way
connection to South Station. This will help provide expansion space both for the burgeoning financial
institutions of downtown Boston and for businesses connected to the airport. While planning for the
reclaimed land in the Artery corridor has received most of the attention, it is this area (in what once
housed seaport functions) that may offer the most important long term economic benefits.
Already the new Federal Court House and the new World Trade Center office/hotel complex are
under construction and the site for the proposed convention center has been selected in the area.
There remain a number of other sites, many under the ownership and control ofMassport and others
owned privately, that will receive the accessibility windfall.
In addition to the metropolitan region's general public, who will be able to take advantage of the
specific facilities and the improved environment created by the CA/T project, there are two specific
categories of beneficiaries who should benefit more than most.34 These are, first, the specific users
33 Peter Blute, Move Massachusetts 2000 Update, April 1997, Vol. 4. No. 4
34 Overall, mitigation practices that have emerged from the Project have raised the standards for large-scale urban construction
in both the quality and quantity of Project-neighborhood interaction. An elaborate community-liaison network that focuses on
advance notification and sanction has given even smaller community groups influence and leverage in day-to-day UCtion
operations. In fact, the public dimension of the Project involves an impressive array of community based groups ranging from
super coalitions like Mass Move 2000 to smaller groups representing distinct constituencies (like the Fort Point artists). Through
the umbrella groups, scores of private and nonprofit organizations have become well-educated, sophisticated, thoroughly active
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of the new highway facilities, and second, the owners and users of the property receiving the
accessibility windfall. Both of these categories should be able to contribute a higher share of the
operating costs of the system, including debt retirement, than the rest of the public.
The users of CA/T system improvements
With the completion of the expanded and depressed Central Artery and the links from the Southeast
Expressway and the Turnpike extension to the Ted Williams Tunnel, there will be dramatic
improvements for highway users (private autos, commercial vehicles like taxis and limousines, and
trucks) making three specific types of trips;
• Those moving through the center of the region from North to and from the South on 1-93
using the Artery. These trips represent about 70% of all traffic carried on the Artery at
present.
• Those using 1-90 and 1-93 to reach downtown destinations, (about 30% of present Artery
traffic).
• Those moving to and from Logan Airport and the North shore communities using the three
tunnels and the Tobin Bridge now serving the area.
Of these three major beneficiaries of travel improvements, users of the tunnels and the Turnpike
extension are the only ones who will be charged a toll for the use of the facilities. Those using 1-93
will not be so charged, even though the Central Artery tunnel will be the major expense of the system.
While the decision not to erect traffic bottleneck-producing toll barriers on 1-93 was made early on
in the design process,3S there may be other technologies available in the future to charge users of the
system elements and help balance out the current charge structure. We note that the issue of the
imbalance of the burden of paying tolls to help finance the costs of the CA/T project were noted at
the recent hearings on the Metropolitan Highway System legislation. While Boston region drivers pay
relatively low tolls on their highway facilities compared to those paid by drivers in the New York
region, for example, they should be able to afford the increases proposed as part of the MHS system
operation. However, the question ofwho among the system beneficiaries should carry the burden of
the costs of these expensive improvements is an issue which should continue to be placed on the
public policy agenda.
in the planning function, and generally able to work out difficulties. In the long term, then, the project may have served to unify
diverse constituencies and even strengthen the political influence of groups in a city that has long been known for being unable
to overcome divisiveness among community stakeholders.
While Federal law provided that new highways built under the Interstate Highway Program were to be toll free, the provisions of the current
Federal regulations can permit Federal Interstate funds to be used for constructing toll facilities, at the discretion of the States.
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Land development beneficiaries
There are a number of specific beneficiaries who should be able to profit from the improved
accessibility of the areas in which their property is located as a result ofCA/T improvements. There
are two which stand out above the rest. These are;
• Property owners in the South Boston industrial waterfront, which include both public
agencies like Massport and a number of private interests. These owners are already
developing plans for major new developments in the area under the general guidance of the
Boston Redevelopment Authority, a situation which should transform the area into one of the
outstanding waterfront commercial and residential areas in future years.
• Property owners in downtown, particularly those public agencies and private interests with
parcels in the Government Center North end area which will benefit greatly from the removal
of the Central Artery viaduct. Included in this mix are the major tourist attractions like
Faneuil Hall Market Place and the New England Aquarium along with some hotels and other
commercial establishments in the North End. These are the properties whose current users
are suffering the most from the current construction activities, but whose owners should reap
the greatest long term benefits.
Windfalls and wipeouts
To date, one of the least discussed features of the CA/T project is the fact that even though it is the
most costly of the major urban highway construction projects undertaken in the United States, it is
likely to be the one in which the windfalls, particularly in the form of the increased value of
affected property, not to mention those accruing to businesses benefiting directly from improved
highway services (taxi and limousine owners featuring Airport service, for example), far outweigh
the wipeouts resulting from property takings. This is a unique feature ofthe program, due in large
part to the ability of most of the improvements to be made within the boundaries of existing rights-of-
way. The ability of the general public, whose agencies and tax resources are paying for this massive
investment, to share in the windfalls should be an important item on the public policy agenda of the
region. 3*
Examining longer term policy issues re: benefits/cost recovery
As the construction of the various pieces of the CA/T project are completed and put into operation,
the important public policy issues will focus in large part on what measures the Commonwealth can
take to recoup the costs of developing this tremendous but costly improvement in the infrastructure
of Metropolitan Boston. While to date the public policy issues have correctly focused on how the
project should be built and what should be included in the extensive package of improvements being
implemented, the policy issues involved in how the benefits are distributed and how the beneficiaries
1
During the intense period of development of the Interstate system in the 1970's, the Federal Highway
Administration undertook a number of research studies designed to determine the extent that the highway program
was creating windfalls and wipeouts and how the windfalls could be ussd to compensate for the negative impact
of the wipeouts.
73
might be asked to contribute to the cost have not received the same scrutiny. Among the range of
urban public services, transportation system improvements in particular are among those most
susceptible to user charges and do not require funding from general tax revenues.
However, there are controversies that can be expected in deciding on good user charge and cost
recovery policy. Which of the various beneficiaries of the improvement should contribute to its
continuing operation and upkeep of the improved system, including servicing its debt ? In what form
should this contribution be collected — through tolls, gas taxes, benefit assessments on affected
property, special licences for major users, additional fees on downtown parking, and others? What
is fair and what will fly? We think these questions are particularly appropriate for the Legislature to
consider since significantly more of the cost of the project will fall on Commonwealth public
resources than was anticipated when the project was conceived in the heyday of the federal
government's Interstate Highway program.
As part of this study, the McCormack Institute was able to benefit from public opinion surveys which
questioned Massachusetts citizens on their attitudes toward the "Big Dig." In one such survey dealing
with attitudes towards broad public policy issues, of those who responded that they had heard
something about the project, over 80% were able to identify benefits resulting from the project and
over 70% responded favorably to the question of whether the state should try to come up with the
money to complete the project if the federal government decided to spend less than its original
share.
37 However, in another survey focusing on the performance on the Massachusetts agencies
during the Weld administration, the response to the question of how the state should pay for the
project, over 60% of the respondents were opposed to increases in tolls on any of the existing
facilities, and higher percentages opposed raising gas taxes or using general revenues. Furthermore,
among all the transportation and public works agencies whose performance was ranked for general
satisfaction, the CA/T project management was ranked the lowest. This led the authors of the survey
to conclude that "the combination of dissatisfaction with project management and lack of support for
funding solutions suggests that the project could become a political nightmare This is a project
in need of more public explanation of the benefits and costs associated with it."38
There are a whole set of public policy issues involved in any attempt to determine what are fair and
equitable methods for encouraging various categories of beneficiaries to contribute to the cost of the
CA/T improvements. But there is also time before the facilities are opened to study the options and
air the debate. Such an airing appears to have some urgency. As a prelude to any legislative action
in this arena, additional research and analysis could provide data for these issues to be identified and
discussed with various parties at interest. We think it would be in the interests of the Commonwealth
to see that this research is carried out with dispassionate education of the public in mind.
From an analysis of the UMass/McCormack surveys of 400 Massachusetts voters conducted in January and
April, 1997
38 From Mass Insight; "State of the State; Year Seven of the Weld Administration" February, 1997 (Mass Insight
surveys conducted by Opinion Dynamics Corporation), pages 14, 15, 19.
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Appendix 1
Analysis of CA/T Project Cost: History and Trend
1. Introduction
This appendix includes a series of notes addressing several topics on the cost of the Central
Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) Project. These include the historical cost growth, the structure of the
project cost managed and reported by the CA/T Project Office, and the monitoring of the project
cost to highlight trends.
2. Tracking Historical Cost Growth Data
Recent news reports cite two different figures for the cost: $7.78 billion in the Boston Globe 1 '2
and 10.4 billion in both the Boston Globe3 and Patriot Ledger4 . At its inception in 1985, the
CA/T Project had an estimated price of $2,564 billion. Subsequent scope and design changes led
to an estimated cost at $7.78 billion5 . Further revisions and additions to the project resulted in the
cost of $10.4 billion6 in 1996. The following paragraphs summarize the nature of these changes
and revisions in order to clarify the contexts of the different cost data.
There are apparent differences between the cost data from Central Artery/Tunnel Project Office
and those used by the GAO. McCormack Institute prepared a set of cost charts for the CA/T Cost
Study7 for comments by CA/T Project Office. We received comments annotated on a working
document prepared by the McCormack study team, the F/C/R, by CA/T project management8 on
March 18, 1997; Attachment 1 in this response includes corrections to various cost figures.
1
Biers, John M, "Rep. Kennedy Denounces Weld Over Possible Big Dig Funds Loss," The Boston Globe , February 6, 1997.
2
Palmer, Thomas, Jr., "State Could Get Help Financing Big Dig From Clinton, Moynihan," The Boston Globe , March 9, 1997, p B8.
3
Palmer, Thomas C, Jr., and John M. Biers, "State Would Lose Less in Highway Bill," The Boston Globe , March 13, 1997, p Al.
4
Layton, Lyndsey, "No Tolls for Expressway," The Patriot Ledger, February 12, 1997, p 6.
5
"Finance Plan," Central Artery/Tunnel Project, Massachusetts Department of Highway, August 1995 as Amended February 1996.
6
"Finance Plan," Central Artery/Tunnel Project, Massachusetts Department of Highway, September 1996.
7
"CA/T Cost Study - Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations(F/C/R): Initial Story Line" Unpublished Working Draft, McCormack Institute,
University of Massachusetts Boston, March 4, 1997.
8 Edwards, Bill, "Joint Venture (CMS/ARL/WHE) Comments on the Working Draft," Attachment 1 to "McCormack Institute Request,"
Interoffice Memorandum to Ann Davis, Central Artery Project, Massachusetts Highway Department, March 13, 1997. This contains both answers
to questions from the McCormack Institute in the said Request and comments to the Initial Story Line, March 4, 1997.
A-l
s
—
B
s
_
B
c
©
23
3
O
C/3
5" £iJ OS
B <
Q IE lT.
/ s / u a
1 f I I §< < < 4 1
3
o
CZ5
OJ
OX)
s
-=
U
—
o
u
—
•5s
-
La
-
E
s
5/5
3
O
1*5
u
O
z
-a
o'
'-
a-
u.
ea
5 u
-5
> s
q 3
on o 2
o
~ 00
"
13
il
j:
U
I*
— —
'
—
o.<
-3 re
<D
• e -3Q U 5 U
c
o
0? "O
O re
5 .5
ON u.
Os 3 . O
*i j
-
00 0*
re a
en
on
o O
e =§ .2
-E </>5 c
su —
»<*-
f/1
<L>
X .e
[
)
ON en
HH LU
B..S
*2
J Ui< <u
Li o
c
«3
St a
00 00
Os <y
~-H os
M
>
oU
Cj
a
"5^8
oo
o
Cl
©0
3
s
a
B
'83
S
CtfJ
«
B
S g>
« 2?
c/3 CO
^ O5
o
a 00
§ I cu £ c
4) (D 3
s" S
3-
o3§§
>
u
UJ
u
5 a->
> a j= b
5 5 —5 as 8 c
U O S E
c< Da £ £
u
oo
E
.2?
Q
— E
u B
CQ 00 S
E X
o «
'2 Oil
S E
u O
s s
QJ OH U
E
E d)
•2 S
p a
s s -s §^O 2cS 3£
s
.1
111E 3 s
<U O" o
« W U
H 2
CO
S3
mOO CQ
•2,Z
tti o
5 E
3 .s
tb -3
£ 00 x
u, a
2
3
CD
3M g3 >
09 O
t/3 fa
1-A| ^ P O.3 -3 <- 3£uu£
f2 «5
a^oo
o2«s £ I
1 2 a .3 8 ™U U J U W 2
II3 o
O0 1
{« OOE ON
ON££c
<N
CL)
333
2.1 Scope Changes: 1985 to 1992
A series of major scope changes occurred in the period from 1985 to 1992. These changes are
summarized in Table 2-1. There are significant cost impacts9 associated with these changes.
Table 2-2 shows the cost increases that are allocated directly to the Central Artery Project.
Table 2-2 Scope Changes, $K
Estimated Cost
Item GAO, 1995 CA/T March
1997
Original Estimates
Charles River Crossing
I-90/I93 HOV Lanes
Right-of-ways
Extend 1-93 South
Utility Relocation
South Boston Haul Road/Bypass Road
Deleted Rte 1A Interchange
508,000
262,000
173,000
130,000
85,000
53,000
(18,000)
508,000
262,000
173,000
130,000
85,000
23,000
(18,000)
Subtotal, CA/T highway
Tunnel Covers
Material Disposal/Hazardous Materials
1,193,000
176,000
141,000
1,163,000
176,000
141,000
Subtotal. Mitigation
Joint Venture Contract
Workmen's Compensation
Other
317,000
263,000
237,000
612,000
317,000
263,000
237,000
642,000
Subtotal, 1,112,000 1,142,000
Total 1993 Estimates
1995 Adjustments (Note 1)
2,622,000
897,000
2,622,000
258,800
Total Adjusted Changes 3,519,000 2,880,800
Table 2-2 shows the scope changes up and through 1995. The costs associated with these
changes are based on comments from the CA/T Project Office and GAO report. 10 There are
differences between the GAO and CA/T data in three items: (1) South Boston Haul Road/Bypass
Road, (2) Other, and (3) 1995 Adjustments. The difference in costs is most pronounced for the
item on "1995 Adjustments".
The item, "Other", has a substantial cost of $612 M (GAO estimate) or $642 M. Neither the
GAO report nor the CA/T Attachment 1 explains the nature of this item.
9
"Joint Venture (CMS/ARL/WHE) Comments on the Working Draft," Attachment 1 to "McCormack Institute Request," Interoffice
Memorandum to Ann Davis, Central Artery Project, Massachusetts Highway Department, March 13, 1997.
10 Kenneth M. Mead, "History of Central Artery/Tunnel Project Costs," Enclosure III, in Letter to Frank Wolf, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Committee on Appropriation, House of Representatives, GA0/RCED-95-213R, June 2, 1995, United States General Accounting
Office, Washington, DC All amounts are in 1994 dollars.
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The item "1995" Adjustment, consists of, according to the GAO report (Enclosure V, p 17),
provisions for further cost growth:
Design cost growth @ 18% $352.0 M
Construction cost growth @ 15% $545.0 M
Total $897.0 M.
The Joint Venture however identified this adjustment (Attachment l) 11 as the Third Party related
costs (see Section 2.2) at $258.8 M.
2.2 Support Costs (Exclusions) and Third-Party
Sometime during the period of 1985-1995, the CA/T Project assumed management responsibility
for a number of other projects related to but not directly part of the core construction of the
Artery and the TunneL These other projects fall into two categories: Support (or exclusions) and
Third Party. The Exclusions are items not included as the direct cost of CA/T Project and are not
eligible for (or excluded from) federal funding support. The cost for these project elements are
referred to as Support Costs by CA/T Project. Table 2-3 tabulates these support items. Also
included in Table 2-3 are the Third Party Costs for projects elements that are paid for by third
parties but are integrated into the CA/T Project. These are primarily MBTA facilities and certain
state-wide roadway projects.
Table 2-3 consists of two parts (A) and (B). Panel (B) shows the Exclusion items listed in CA/T
Finance Plan
1
. Panel (A) lists the items included in the GAO report 1 . The costs in Panel (A) are
those reported by GAO as well as those based on comments from CA/T.
It is noted that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the items in Panels (A) and (B).
The total estimated by GAO is $12 million higher than the CA/T estimate. Finally it is noted that
in Panel (B) there is one item referred to as Third party cost at $13 million.
11
"Joint Venture (CMS/ARL/WHE) Comments on the Working Draft," Attachment 1 to "McCormack Institute Request," Interoffice Memorandum
to Ann Davis, Central Artery Project, Massachusetts Highway Department, March 13, 1997.
"
"Finance Plan", Central Artery/Tunnel Project, Massachusetts Department of Highway, August 1995"as Amended February 1996, p 13.
Exclusions are from Kenneth M. Mead "Summary of Items Excluded from MHD's Draft Estimate," Enclosure IV, in Letter to Frank Wolf,
Chairman. Subcommittee on Transportation Committee on Appropriation, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-95-213R June 2, 1995, United
States General Accounting Office, Washington, DC. All amounts are in 1994 dollars.
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Table 2-3 Support Costs (Exclusions). $K
1
<A> (B)
Items GAO
Estimates
1995
CA/T items
Estimates
Mar 1997
CA/T !
8/95,
Amended 2/96
^Connections to Turnpike Facilities
Logan Airport (Connections to Rte 1A)
flMaintenance/Support Facilities
llunnel Fire Testing (in W. Virginia, for CA/T
Tunnels)
Temporary Facilities (1-93 ramps, message signs
etc.)
Scope Deferrals (HOV)
tl]
248,900
177,000
52,700
44,600
19,100
18,100
[2]
230,000 Project/Toll Interfaces
180,000 Logan Airport Interchange
55,000 Operation/Maintenance
45,000 Research and Development
Agreements
19,000
18,000
[3]
230,000
180,000
55,000
45,000
Highway Cost
Transit Related
North-South Rail Link
State-only Funded Items
560,400
68,600
6,300
169,500
547,000 Highway Cost
67,000 Transit Related Scope
6,000
170,000 State Transportation Improvements
510,000
67,000
170.000
Other Transportation-related Cost
Surface Restoration (CA, Ft Point Ch, Spectacle
I.)
Environmental Mitigation (Cambridge; CB
training; Fire Departments, etc)
244,400
69,400
105,700
243,000 Other Transportation-related Cost
50,000 Artery Restoration Enhancements
105,000 Environmental Mitigation
Agreements
Mitigation/Interagency Service
237,000
50,000
30,000
75.000
Mitigation Cost
Others
17S.,100
29,900
155,000 Mitigation Cost
53,000 Other(Broadway, Summer St
bridges, surface streets.)
Third Party Cost (MBTA)
155,000
82 OOOl
Others, subtotal 29,000 53,000 95,000|
Total 1,009,800 998,000 Total 997,OOo|
2.3 Inflation
In addition to the effects of scope changes and exclusions, the CA/T Project cost has been
escalating due to inflation. The cost increases over the years due to inflation are summarized in
Table 2-4.
The data on inflation are drawn from three sources. There appears to be significant divergence in
the estimated inflation for the period from 1994 through 2004. The CA/T estimate of $1387
million is nearly 100% higher than the GAO estimate of $737 million.
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Table 2-4 Cost Impact from Inflation, $ M
Inflation
SM
Notes
1985
1987
1989
1991
1992
1993
565
462
458
641
428
1
1
1
1
1
Subtotal
1994-2004
2554
2,3
GAO CAJT
737 1387
Total 3291 3941
• Note 1:
• Note 2:
• Note 3:
Inflation data from Luberoff and Altshuler. 14
Inflation estimates, GAO report (Enclosure V). 15
Inflation estimates, CA/T (Attachment l) 16
2.3 1995/1996 Cost Estimates
The preceding account of the elements of cost growths are summarized in Table 2-5 indicating
the resultant cost estimates of $7.74 billion in the 1995 Finance Plan and of $10.4 billion in the
1996 Finance Plan.
Table 2-4 shows the cost growth on the CA/T Project from 1985 to 1996 based on the changes
described above both in accordance with the GAO estimates and the CA/T estimates. The final
1995 and 1996 estimates from the two organizations are identical although there are large
differences in the estimated scope adjustments in 1995 and the expected out-year inflation. Table
2-6 shows the historical cost growth trend using the scope change data from Luberoff and
Altshuler (1996). In this table, we use the 1995 GAO estimates for the adjustments and future
inflation allowance. The result, as noted above, would be unchanged for the total estimated cost
in 1995. Figure 1 shows the cost growth graphically.
14
Luberoff, David, and Alan Altshuler, "Mega-Project: A Political History of Boston's Multibillion-Dollar Artery/Tunnel Project." J. F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University. Revised Edition, April 1996.
15
Kenneth M. Mead, "History of Central Artery/Tunnel Project Costs," Enclosure III, in Letter to Frank Wolf, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Committee on Appropriation, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-95-213R, June 2, 1995, United States General Accounting
Office, Washington, DC. All amounts are in 1994 dollars.
16
"Joint Venture (CMS/ARL/WHE) Comments on the Working Draft," Attachment 1 to "McCormack Institute Request," Interoffice
Memorandum to Ann Davis, Central Artery Project, Massachusetts Highway Department, March 1 3, 1997.
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Table 2-5 Budget Estimates, $M
GAO CA/T
1985 Estimate 2,564 2,564
Inflation through 1993 2,554 2,554
Scope Change Pre-95 2,622 2,622
1995 Estimate, Unadjusted 7,740 7,740
Exclusions 1,010 998
Scope, 1995 897 259
Inflation 1993-1995 737 1,387
1995 Estimate 10,384 10,384
1996 Finance Plan 10,400 10,400
Table 2-6 History of Project Cost Estimate
Year Estimate Exclusions Changes Inflation Projected Cost
1985 2,564.0 - - - 2,564.0
1987 3,185.0 46.0 565.0 3,175.0
1989 4,436.0 799.0 462.0 4,446.0
1991 5,193.0 299.0 458.0 5,193.0
1992 6,443.0 609.0 641.0 6,443.0
1993 7,740.0 869.0 428.0 7,740.0
1995 7,740.0 1,009.8 897.0 737.0 10,383.8
1996 10,400.0 10,400.0
Total 1,009.8 3,519.0 3,291.0
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Figure 1 Growth of Project Cost
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2.4 Finance Plan Budgets
The Finance Plan (August 1995 as amended February 1996) lists the CA/T budget being $7.78
billion in 1995 and $10.4 billion in 1996. The Finance Plan, September 1996, reaffirms the
budget at $10.4 billion. Table 2-7 summarizes the budgets by functions.
Table 2-7 Summary of Financial Plans, $B
Finance Plan
8/95 amended 2/96
Finance Plan
9/96
[11 [21 [3]
Type C/SUR6
Estimate
(Updated)
Total (2/ 96) Cost to Date
(7/1/96)
Remaining
(7/1/96)
Total
(7/1/96)
Construction
Design
Right of Way
Sale of Air Rights
Prior to ICE and
Committed Escalation
Program Management
5.871
0.770
0.386
-0.225
-0.391
1.369
7.1
0.9
0.4
2.0
2.4
0.8
0.4
1.3
4.7
0.2
0.0
0.5
7.2
1.0
0.4
1.8
Total 7.780 10.4 4.9 5.4 10.41
A-8
Need as of Source
7/1/95 Finance Plan, 8/95 Amended 2/96, Table 1
7/1/95 Finance Plan, 9/96, p vii
7/1/96 Finance Plan, 9/96, p vii
Table 2-7 shows that the total budget and need-as-of date are:
Budget. $B
[1] 7.78
[2] 10.4
[3] 10.4
There is a discrepancy of $40M between the budgets of $7.74 B and $7.78 B in Table 2-5 and
Table 2-7 respectively for the unadjusted 1995 estimates. This may be in part due to the 'saving'
of $225 million from air rights in column [1] whereas elsewhere in the Finance Plan, the air rights
are 'saving' from air rights.
The saving from air rights is also referred to as credit for future sale of air rights.
Whichever the name , the item amounts to a reduction of project cost when it is credited
to the project account. Section 3.1 provides a discussion on the inclusion of this item in
the budget.
There is a large increase in estimated management cost from $1,369 billion in February 1995 to
$1,805 billion in September 1996. There is no explanation in the Finance Plan for the large
increase in the management cost. Factors that possibly contribute to this increase include:
Insurance, Management cost for the Exclusions and scope changes, and reserves.
We considers the September 1996 Finance Plan Estimate, Column [3], as the latest official
baseline; this is also widely cited by various government officials and news media. The operating
budget in the CA/T monthly management report differs from that in the Finance Plan budget.
Even for the month of June 1996, the base month for the Finance Plan, the budgets are $10.92 B
(excluding air rights) and $10.4 B respectively.
3. Cost Structure and Monthly Management Report
3.1 Project Cost Summary
The Central Artery/Tunnel Project Office holds monthly meetings for management review. The
Monthly Management Report is therefore the most useful method to for tracking progress on the
project and related changes. The CA/T Project office manages the project cost in three parts:
CA/T Direct Costs, Support Costs, and Third Party Related Costs. However, the monthly
management report includes only two cost charts:
CA/T Direct Costs and
Support Costs (Includes Third Party Related Costs).
A-9
rhese charts, Panels ( A) and (B), from the monthly report for January 1997 (pp. 17A and 17B)
are shown in rank 3-1. Oddly, the report docs not include a top level summary chart for the total
project under management Tabic 3- 1 includes this missing chart. Panel (C), for the total cost,
i.e., the sum of the direct and the support costs.
Air Rights
The cost elements in these charts include a credit for air rights. CA/T Project Office regards this
as a potential cost saving and treats it as a cost item in the budget. The consequence of this
treatment is a reduced project cost. The McCormack Institute regards the recovery of the air
rights as a source of revenue that, when recovered at a future date, would partially pay for the
cost of the project. It is not a cost saving on the project. The CA/T Project results in a future
physical asset owned by the Massachusetts Highway System; the value of the asset value
includes marketable value of the air rights. There is a difference between these two views: (1) the
cost to acquire an asset, the project cost and (2) the future book value after a part of the asset is
disposed of. Consistent with view (1), the total costs in these panels in Table 3-1 are adjusted to
exclude the air rights. (CA/T Project Office acknowledges this alternate method of accounting in
its September 1996 Finance Plan by excluding the air rights in its budget estimate of $10.4
billion.)
Current Budget: Unescalated vs. Escalated
CA/T management report shows both unescalated and escalated current budgets. The escalated
current budget is the more meaningful of the two because it represents the expected cost as it is
incurred and paid for in nominal money. In the discussion to follow, the current budget,
escalated, is used unless stated otherwise. However, before we leave the subject of unescalated
budget, we note that the total direct cost budget (unescalated) is $7998M in Panel (A) whereas
Finance Plan budget estimate is $7780M. 17 The difference between these two budget numbers is
a sizeable $218 M. The escalation of the total project cost, Panel (C), is $1,233 B (=10.991-
9.758) also does not appear to relate to the estimated inflation in Table 2-5. Thus the origin of the
budget plan in Table 3-1 remains a question.
'
"Finance Plan," Central Artery/Tunnel Project, Massachusetts Department of Highway, August 1995 as Amended February 1996, Table 1, p
12.
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3.2 Design and Construction
[He month!) report includes a series of gantt charts. The charts list time lines and cost data for
work packages on design and construction. These charts, (pp. 3-13), tabulate the package costs
by final design and construction for the segments of the project. One chart (January 1997 report,
p. 2) provides summary data on the project activities. Table 3-2 shows these summary data. These
summary data are also in agreement with the subsidiary package cost data in the gantt charts.
Table 3-2 Design and Construction Costs
(January 1997)
vVBS Current Budget Potential Forecast Cost-to-date
(Escalated)
Final Design
Tunnel 94.1 94.1 88.3
1-90 188.2 192.7 182.9
1-93 335.9 342.6 308.7
Systemwide 58.3 57.3 53.5
Design reserve 11.7 7.6
Subtotal Final Design 688.2 694.3 633.4
Construction
Tunnel 1115.3 1126.3 1104.5
1-90 1702.1 1738.5 790.2
1-93 3819.4 3964.3 1956.6
Systemwide 592.2 600.9 213.5
Misc. 27.9 27.8 7.6
Subtotal Construction 7256.9 7457.8 4072.4
Total 7945.1 8152.1 4705.8
The subtotal for construction cost in Table 3-2 are in agreement with the costs for construction
packages in Table 3-1, Panel (C). Because of this agreement for the construction packages, one
would also expect similar agreement for the total cost of the final design packages. The design
costs in Table 3-2 are different from and lower than the cost data in Table 3-1, in Panel (C) for
the total project cost. Table 3-3 displays these discrepancies.
Table 3-3 Differences between Design Costs in January 1996 Report
JFmal Design Budget Forecast Cost-to-Date
(Project Summary
(Table 3-1
(Design & Construction
Table 3-2
852
688
859
694
759
633
(Unidentified Design
1 Items
164 165 126
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3.3 Project Reserves
The cost data in the CA/T monthly report include various reserves. These are summarized in
Table 3-4 from the January 1997 report. Reserves are held in accounts for design, construction,
and management. The construction reserves are also known as project change authorization
(PCA). Total reserve at end of January 1997 has a budget of $390 million and a forecast of
$251.7 million.
Table 3-4 Summary of Project Reserve (January 1997)
Current
Budget
Potential
Forecast
Design reserve 11.7 7.6
Construction (PCA)
Tunnel
1-90
1-93
j
Subtotal Construction
74
151.1
28.8
253.9
71.2
145.3
27.6
244.1
(Management Reserve 124.4
|Total 390.0 251.7
3.4 Joint Venture Management Cost
The Joint Venture is currently operating under contracts for Work Plans 13 and 14. The monthly
management includes separate management review charts (pp. 28A and 28B) for these two
plans. Table 3-5 below shows the combined status of these two charts for month of January
1997.
Table 3-5 Management Cost, WP 13 and WP 14, $M
i
[Contract
(Max
Forecast Current
Budget
Expenditure
|
Direct Labor |
Indirect Labor
Base Fee
Budgeted Incentive Fee
170.3
189.5
36.0
3.6
170.3
189.5
36.0
3.6
30.7
34.0
6.6
0.0
28.7
30.0
6.6
0.0
Total Labor Related
Direct Expense
Director's Reserve
399.4
91.9
1.8
399.4
91.9
1.8
71.3
22.2
1.8
65.3
16.5
Total Direct Expense
Total Before Reserve
Reserve for Cost Basis Adj.
93.7
491.3
19.1
93.7
491.3
19.1
24.0
95.3
16.51
81.71
[Total 510.4 510.4 95.3 81.7
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The management cost charts (pp. 28A and 28B) provide information only for a segment of the
overall management cost They do not directly relate to the project cost summary charts in Table
3-1 because the management report does not show explicitly cither the pre-WP 13/14 cost or the
post-WP 13/14 cost. The contract expiration dates are June 1997 for Work Plan 13 and
December 1999 for Work Plan 14. We assume that both work plans, 13 and 14, started on or
about 7/1/96 and that the cost prior to 7/1/96 were covered by Work Plans through No. 12. Since
the contracts for work plan 14 expires in 1999, there will be a future work plan for management
beyond 1^99 until the completion of the CA/T Project in 2004. With these assumptions, one can
infer from Table 3- 1 and Table 3-5 that the future cost as shown in Table 3-6. This table
indicates that beyond the contracts for work plans 13 and 14, there is a future work plan cost of
$210 million required to complete the CA/T Project. Thus, the sum total of cost for work plan
13/14 and future work plans is $720 million, as shown in the last row of Table 3-6. This sum
represents the to-go cost as of July 1, 1996. This compares with the to-go estimate of $505
million in the Finance Plan (September 1996). Thus, with the Finance Plan as a baseline, the
current monthly report (January 1997) projects a cost growth of $215 million for the Joint
Venture management.
Table 3-6 Reconciliation of Management Cost, $M
Budget Cost-to- Estimate-to-
Date Complete
Prior Work Plans, prior to 912 912
7/1/96
Work Plan 13
Work Plans 14 510 82 409.
(from Table 3-5)
Future Work Plan(s) 210 210
Project Management Total 1632 994 638
(from Table 3-1)
Work Plans, 7/1/96 to 720 82 638
Completion
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3.5 Budgets and Cost Variances
The Project currently uses a different breakout of the cost items from that in the Finance Plan
which uses only four line items. This makes it difficult to analyze variance of any specific cost
items. As an illustration, we consolidate the line items in the January 1997 management report to
correspond to the items in the Finance Plan as shown in Table 3-7.
Table 3-7 Budgets and Cost Variances, $B
7/96 Budget
Potential
Forecast
Variance
Forecast - Budget
Type Finance Plan,
Sep 1996
Mgmt Report
Jan 97
$B % of
7/97 Budget
IConstruction
[Design
Right of Way
Management
7.20
1.00
0.40
1.80
7.85
1.01
0.47
1.63
0.65
0.01
0.07
-0.17
9.1%
0.8%
18.5%
-9.4%
|Total 10.40 10.97 0.57 5.4%
In this consolidation,
Two construction items and the geotech item in Table 3-1 are combined;
Two design items are summed together; and
Joint Venture and insurance items are lumped into one item.
Table 3-7 compares the consolidated forecast from the management report with the budgets for
the comparable items from the 1996 Finance Plan. The variances between the forecast and
budgets are shown in the left columns, in dollars and in percents.
The comparison indicates that the bulk of the cost increase is due to construction, at $650M, and
the management cost has a projected reduction at $170M.
• Overall project cost increase is $0.57 B, at 5.4% of budget.
• In percentage, right-of-way incurs the largest increase at 18.5%.
• Management (including insurance and reserve) has the most favorable change at -
9.4%.
The negative variance for management is most likely a consequence of including insurance and
reserve in management at one time but excluding them at another. We examine this later.
It appears that the management line items in Table 3-7 have different compositions in the various
budgets and forecast because of the different way insurance and management reserves are
accounted for. Thus an appropriate way to evaluate cost variance is not to consolidate but to
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disaggregate the line items to be consistent with the break out in the Management Report. We
believe thai the decomposition in Table 3-8 accomplishes this equalization.
Table 3-8 Decomposing Budget and Cost Variances, $B
' ^ Budaei Potential Variance
Forecast Forecast- 7/96 Budget
[a] [b] [cj=[b]-[a] Id]
T\pe Finance Plan,
Sep 1996
Mgmt Report
Jan 97
$b % 7/96 Budget
Construction 7.200 7.853 0.653 9.1%
Design 1.000 1.008 0.008 0.8%
Right of Way 0.400 0.474 0.074 18.5%
Management & 1.800 1.631 -0.169 -9.4%
Other
Insurance 0.389 -0.001 -0.390 -100.3%
Reserve 0.125 0.000 -0.125 -100.0%
Management 1.286 1.632 0.346 26.9%
Total 10.400 10.966 0.566 5.4%
Table 3-8 treats insurance and reserve as separate line items by making two
assumptions.
Assumption (1): Commitment on insurance, $389 M, in Table 3-1, was expenditure
incurred prior to Work Plans 13/14.
Assumption (2): The September 1996 Finance Plan estimate for the management cost
indeed has $125 M tucked in Management as reserve.
Given these assumptions, the actual management cost in the Finance Plan is as shown
in Table 3-8, in amount of $1,286 billion.
By restating the budgets with separate sub items as in Table 3-8, one sees a dramatic
difference in the cost variance on the management items.
Whereas the variance for management is negative at $169M when it is inclusive, the
variance becomes positive at $346M when it is exclusive.
The variance as percentage has a swing of 26.3%, from -9.4 to +26.9%, when the
reserve and insurance cost are removed from the management line item.
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4. Analysis of CA/T Contract Bid Prices and Contractors
4.1 Introduction
McCormack Institute received from CA/T Project Office a 71 -item listing of the contract bid
prices along with the pre-bid estimated costs. There were wide differences between the highest
and the lowest bid prices for most contracts. Furthermore, there have been differences between
the estimated cost and the actual bids.
4.2 Data on Bids
The data on bids cover 71 contracts in period from 1990 through January 1997 and are displayed
in Table 4-1. The values of awarded contracts, to the low bidders, varied from under $500K to
about $400,000K. There are significant differences between the bids and the estimates. For the
individual contracts, the ratio of high bid to low bid varies from 1.00 to 3.00.
The following paragraphs present the results of analyzing the bid data.
4.3 Summary Statistics
The low and high bids, relative to the estimates, are both essentially normally distributed. The
normalized low and high have mean values of 0.84 and 1.16 respectively. That is to say, on the
average, the low bid is 16% below and the high bid is 16% above the cost estimate. Since the
contracts are awarded to low bidders, one infers that any contract would have a value that is
statistically at 16% below the estimate.
The mean difference between the low bid price and the estimated price show variation according
to work breakdown (or project segment), Table 4-1, and according to year of contract award,
Table 4-2. In these tables, the column "Sum" shows the total difference between the bid values
and the estimated values of the contracts according to the classification.
Table 4-1 Difference between Low Bid and Estimate by WBS, $K
WBS Sum Average!
S. Boston
E. Boston
South Bay
C. Artery
C. A. North
Projectwide
Geotech
General
(23,876)
(93,514)
(118,139)
(67,088)
2,055
(77,970)
50
(8,572)
(2,171)
(8,501)
(11,814)
(4,473)
294
(7,797)
17
(2,143)
Total (387,055) (5,451)
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Table 4-2 Difference between Low Bid and Estimate by Year of Award, $K
Year Sum Average
1990 (578) (289)
1991 (34,353) (4,294)
[992 (83,636) (10,455)
1993 (72,863) (6,072)
L994 (67,264) (5,174)
L995 (104,122) (8,009)
1996 (64,300) (4,946)
1997 40,061 20,030
Total (387,055) (5,451)
4.4 Distribution of High and Low Bids
The graph in Figure 2 shows the ratios high/estimate and low/estimate as functions of estimate.
Visually there appears to be no relationship between the deviation bids from estimate that can be
attributed to the magnitude of the estimate. This observation is corroborated by the results of
regression analysis. The magnitude of estimate explains neither the high bid nor the low bid at
57c level of significance.
Figure 2 Ratios of High and Low Bids Relative to Estimate, $K
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One should be cautious in interpreting the meaning of the data on the bids, particularly in
attempting to predict future outcome. Section 5 examines the trends in the project.costs including
the construction cost since January 1997.
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5. Monitoring CA/T Cost Forecast and Variances
5.1. Introduction
The CA/T monthly management report is an essential tool for monitoring the performance of the
Project. Each report provides a snapshot of the status of the project in time. This section of
describes a methodology of using the reports for continuous monitoring of the project cost.
5.2 Methodology
Project Cost Summary
The financial data in the monthly reports provide the trends of the various project cost elements.
To track the history of budget changes and forecast, we have recorded the summary cost data
from the management reports. This provides a convenient way of examining and comparing the
individual panels (Table 3-1) in a single spreadsheet. Also included on this sheet are the
summary data on design and construction costs for the four major cost components (i.e., tunnel,
1-90, 1-93, and system-wide) of the CA/T Project. These costs are then summarized in Table 5-1
for those months for which we had the monthly reports. In Table 5-1, the project direct cost
excludes air rights and the project support cost includes Third Party Costs.
Table 5-1 Monthly Summary Costs
Direct Costs, $M Support Costs, $M Direct + Support Cost, $M
Current Current Potential Cost-to- Current Current Potential Cost-to- Current Current Potential Cost-to-
Budget Budget Forecast date Budget Budget Forecast date Budget Budget Forecast date
(Unescal (Escalate (Unescal (Escalate (Unescal (Escalate
ated) d) ated) d) ated) d)
Direct Cost Support Cost Direct + Support
Mar-96 8253 9301 9146 3332 1426 1607 1527 386 9679 10908 10673 3718
Apr-96 8253 9302 9205 4951 1424 1605 1516 402 9677 10907 10721 5353
Jun-96 8254 9300 9384 5081 1437 1621 1495 406 9691 10921 10879 5487
Sep-96 8254 9301 9441 5193 1451 1637 1461 587 9705 10938 10902 5780
Jan-97 8253 9301 9510 6299 1505 1690 1456 637 9758 10991 10966 6936
Feb-97 8318 9377 9716 6655 1445 1619 1384 639 9763 10996 11100 7294
! Mar-97 8318 9619 9788 7022 1247 1384 1324 675 9565 11003 11112 7697
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One makes ihe following observations from the one-year data in Table 5-1.
[be budget cost Oi $10.4 billion,11 the "nominal cost", which was used in the Finance Plan of September 1996,
is not m (he table. The September 1996 Finance Plan forecast "to-go" cost at $5.5 billion as a mid-range
tcenvio, die high being $6.0 billion. " Since the cost-to-date was $4.9 billion,' the total project cost (escalated)
was implicitly $10.4 billion, the mid-range estimate, or $10.9 billion, the high-end estimate. The CA/T Project
Office apparently uses the high-end estimate as the escalated budget in its monthly management report.
(b) The upward trend of the "Current Budget, Unescalated" for the Direct Cost since September 1996 is not
explained There has not been any known change in the scope of the project over this one-year period. Since
ihe issuance Of the September 1996 Finance Plan, the inflation rate has been fairly stable. Thus, there is no
apparent cause for the change in the budget.
(c) Also unexplained is the trend towards lower Support Cost budget and the dramatically decreasing forecast for
the Support Cost.
Figure 3 displays graphically these cost trends in Table 5-1 for the direct cost, support cost, and
total cost, both the budgets and forecast, by month. There has been a clear rise in the Direct Cost
The decline in Support Cost is also very evident. This decline partly negates the unfavorable
trend in the Direct Cost.
Figure 3
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5.3 Design and Construction: Forecast and Variance
Table 5-2 summarizes the design and construction forecast for those months where data are
available: June 1996, January through March 1997. The table includes also budgets for the
month June 1996, the base month. One notes the rapid increase in the construction costs since
June 1996.
Table 5-2 Monthly Forecast of Design and Construction (Zosts
Budget Forecast
Rnal Design
Jun-96 Jun-96 Sep-96 Jan-97 Feb-97 Mar-97
Tunnel 94.1 94.7 94.1 94.1 94.4
1-90 184.5 186.9 192.7 193.5 192.5
1-93 318.2 325 342.6 340.9 341.9
systemwide 56.3 57.2 57.3 57.3 57.3
Design reserve 13.1 8 7.6 7.3 10
Final Design 666.2 671.8 694.3 693.1 696.1
Construction
'
Tunnel 1107.2 1123.6 1126.3 1127.2 1127.4
1-90 1583 1557.6 1738.5 1745.1 1703.2
1-93 3733.9 3781.5 3964.3 4087.3 4174.8
systemwide
Total
553.8
6977.9
578.9 600.9 602.6 604.7
7041.6 7430 7562.2 7610.1
Misc. 28 28 27.8 27.8 27.8
Construction 7005.9 7069.6 7457.8 7590 7637.9
Mgmt Reserve 259.3
Total 7931.4 7741.4 8152.1 8283.1 8334
Figure 6 shows the bar graphs of the variances, i.e., the deviation of forecast from the budget, for
the three groups of cost items: Design/construction/reserve; construction cost by segments; and
project direct and support costs. The first two groups of variances are derived from Table 5-2 and
the last group is derived from data in Table 5-1.
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